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I. INTRODUCTION 
Part of the genius of the common law inheres in its ability to 
assimilate a new type of activity into existing categories. In the case of 
litigation investment (also known as third-party litigation finance, 
litigation funding, or alternative litigation financing), several 
alternative common-law characterizations are available by analogy. Is 
this new form of economic activity best understood as an ordinary 
commercial-lending contract, a form of insurance, a commercial joint 
venture, venture capital financing, or an alternative lawyer-client fee 
arrangement? The question is important not only to classical legal 
formalists who fetishize legal taxonomy. Categorizing litigation 
investment carries significant implications for the content of the 
parties’ rights and obligations in litigation-investment relationships as 
well. 
This Article proposes a framework of legal norms with 
reference to those governing relevantly similar economic activity. 
What makes an activity relevantly similar depends on a number of 
factors, including the parties’ reasons for entering into a relationship 
(transferring risk, hedging, obtaining capital, drawing from the 
expertise of other actors, etc.), the risks associated with the 
relationship (opportunistic behavior, agency costs, effects on third 
parties, etc.), and the costs and benefits of legal rules (incentives, 
opportunities for strategic behavior, administration and enforcement 
costs, etc.). Constructing a regime of legal norms by analogy to an 
existing area of law requires attention to both the law’s external 
values and principles and the law’s internal normative structure; that 
is to say, one arguing by analogy must be attentive to the immanent 
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rationality of the two domains.1 Doing so involves grasping the law 
from the internal point of view while understanding the underlying 
economic realities. 
This Article begins by describing the market for investment in 
commercial litigation.2 Litigation-investment transactions share 
features of existing economic relationships, such as commercial 
lending, liability insurance, contingent fee–financed representation, 
and venture capital, but none of these existing practices furnishes a 
suitable analogy for regulating litigation investment. Like third-party 
insurance, litigation investment is a way to manage the risk 
associated with litigation while bringing to bear the particular subject 
matter expertise of a risk-neutral institutional actor.3 Insurance 
 
 1. See Ernest J. Weinrib, Legal Formalism: On the Immanent Rationality of Law, 97 YALE 
L.J. 949, 951–52 (1988) (contrasting the external “political” purposes of law with the law’s 
intelligibility as an internally coherent phenomenon). 
 2. The litigation-investment market is differentiated into two sectors, consumer and 
commercial. See STEVEN GARBER, ALTERNATIVE LITIGATION FINANCING IN THE UNITED STATES: 
ISSUES, KNOWNS, AND UNKNOWNS 1 (2010) (describing the makeup of the litigation-investment 
market), available at http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/occasional_papers/2010/ 
RAND_OP306.pdf. A third sector, comprising subprime lending to plaintiffs’ law firms, is not 
generally considered in discussions of investment in litigation. Id. Consumer litigation investing 
companies pay cash to plaintiffs with pending lawsuits, typically personal injury claims, in 
exchange for an escalating percentage of the proceeds eventually recovered by way of judgment 
or settlement. Id. at 9. These payments are often marketed as a way for plaintiffs to pay living or 
medical expenses, although there is no restriction on what recipients can do with the funds. Id. 
at 12. The investment (funding companies strenuously resist the label “loan” to avoid the 
transactions being subject to state usury statutes) is nonrecourse, so that if the plaintiff loses on 
a motion or at trial, the funder recovers nothing. Id. at 10; see also Julia H. McLaughlin, 
Litigation Funding: Charting a Legal and Ethical Course, 31 VT. L. REV. 615, 620 (2007). Huge 
repayment obligations have also been featured in some of the reported cases involving consumer 
litigation funding. See, e.g., Fausone v. U.S. Claims, Inc., 915 So. 2d 626, 628 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
2005) (referring to a repayment obligation of $42,890). Accordingly, proposals to regulate the 
consumer sector of the litigation-investment market (as opposed to calls for its outright 
elimination) have typically focused on transparency, capping rates of return, and meaningful 
disclosure requirements. See, e.g., Susan Lorde Martin, Litigation Financing: Another Subprime 
Industry that Has a Place in the United States Market, 53 VILL. L. REV. 83, 115 (2008) 
(suggesting a set of solutions that would quell litigation-funding abuses); Susan Lorde Martin, 
The Litigation Financing Industry: The Wild West of Finance Should Be Tamed Not Outlawed, 
10 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 55, 68 (2004) (suggesting disclosure requirements for plaintiffs 
seeking lawsuit financing). This Article will focus on the market’s commercial sector, which 
presents very different economic costs and benefits. See also Maya Steinitz, Whose Claim Is This 
Anyway? Third-Party Litigation Funding, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1268, 1275–77 (2011) (referring to 
commercial litigation investment as “second-wave litigation funding,” to distinguish commercial 
litigation from the consumer sector). 
 3. See Michele DeStefano, Nonlawyers Influencing Lawyers: Too Many Cooks in the 
Kitchen or Stone Soup?, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 2791, 2829 (2012) (appealing to the value of the 
expertise of repeat-player investors); Jonathan T. Molot, A Market in Litigation Risk, 76 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 367, 369 (2010) [hereinafter Molot, Litigation Risk] (characterizing litigation investment 
as a market solution to the problem of hedging or offloading litigation risk); Jonathan T. Molot, 
Litigation Finance: A Market Solution to a Procedural Problem, 99 GEO. L.J. 65, 107 (2010) 
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companies and litigation investors may be systematically in a better 
position to reduce the risk of litigation, either through risk pooling or 
information-cost advantages. Like insurance and contingent fee 
financing, litigation investment involves the provision of funds for 
legal representation by someone other than the litigant, whose 
interests are contractually aligned with the litigant’s interests. Most 
lawyers who handle cases on a contingent fee basis, however, are 
limited in the size and complexity of cases they can self-fund, due to 
opportunity costs and the lack of sufficient capital to absorb a 
substantial loss. Litigation investment therefore provides some of the 
risk-transferring benefit of contingent fee representation while taking 
advantage of the potential of diversifying among a large pool of 
lawsuits. Unlike most types of insurance sold in the United States,4 
but like contingent fee representation, the litigation-funding 
relationship arises only after a dispute has ripened into an actual or 
contemplated lawsuit.5 Litigation investment, like both liability 
insurance and contingent fee financing, also has the potential to 
complicate the traditional conception of legal representation as a two-
party, attorney-client relationship and to increase the agency costs 
inherent in any principal-agent relationship.6 
 
[hereinafter Molot, Litigation Finance] (arguing that the presence of third-party investment 
tends to correct for imbalances in the parties’ risk preferences that interferes with accurate 
settlements); Charles Silver, Litigation Funding Versus Liability Insurance: What’s the 
Difference? 2 (Univ. Tex. Law Sch. Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 441), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2247973 (stating third-party insurance lets 
individuals trade the risks of civil litigation in the present for a carrier’s willingness to bear that 
risk in the future). 
 4. After-the-event (“ATE”) insurance, available in the United Kingdom, functions as a 
hedge against the risk of having to pay costs in the event of an unsuccessful lawsuit. It is 
therefore more similar to litigation investment, as that term is used here, than third-party 
liability insurance. In fact, until recently, the legal system in the United Kingdom has taken 
virtually the opposite approach to the United States, prohibiting contingent fees but permitting 
third-party investment in litigation. See Molot, Litigation Finance, supra note 3, at 92–93. 
 5. Michelle Boardman vigorously contests the analogy between third-party liability 
insurance and litigation investment. See Michelle Boardman, Insurers Defend and Third Parties 
Fund: A Comparison of Litigation Participation, 8 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y, 673, 689–97 (2012). Her 
arguments are rejected by Silver, supra note 3, at 10–18, and one of the authors. See Anthony J. 
Sebok, Control Issues: Litigation Investment, Insurance Law, and Double Standards 27 (Cardozo 
Legal Studies Research Paper No. 394, 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2271762 (explaining that while liability insurance can theoretically be 
separated into two forms, it sells as one unit in the United States because insurers typically 
demand selection of counsel and settlement, as well as major incidents of control in the liability 
litigation).  
 6. For the literature on the effect of third-party insurance on the attorney-client 
relationship, see, for example, Tom Baker, Liability Insurance Conflicts and Defense Lawyers: 
From Triangles to Tetrahedrons, 4 CONN. INS. L.J. 101, 106–13 (1997); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., 
Triangular Lawyer Relationships: An Exploratory Analysis, 1 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 15, 21–31 
(1987); Nancy J. Moore, Ethical Issues in Third-Party Payment: Beyond the Insurance Defense 
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To better inform the thinking about regulating litigation 
investment by analogy to existing legal categories, we suggest 
beginning with the risks that motivate mitigation efforts. With the 
most salient potential harms in mind, it may then be possible to settle 
on the best approach to regulate litigation investment.7 Depending on 
what we identify as the most significant risks, the solution might 
involve private ordering, self-regulation of the industry’s practices, 
common-law rights of action recognized by courts in favor of affected 
parties, legislation or administrative rulemaking, or some combination 
of these approaches. Part II considers the ways in which the parties’ 
litigation-investment relationship creates the possibility of 
exploitation, shirking, holding out, withholding relevant information, 
interference with conducting litigation, or other instances of 
wrongdoing. While the standard Coasean response to these risks 
would be that sophisticated commercial-contracting parties can simply 
bargain to an acceptable allocation of risks, legal impediments might 
prevent efficient bargaining. Because of the sequential nature of the 
parties’ performance in a long-term commercial relationship, one 
party may behave opportunistically even if an efficient bargain is 
reached, unless legal doctrines, such as the implied duty of good faith 
and fair dealing, restrain such conduct, and unless the cost of 
 
Paradigm, 4 CONN. INS. L.J. 259, 261–85 (1997); Thomas D. Morgan, What Insurance Scholars 
Should Know About Professional Responsibility, 4 CONN. INS. L.J. 1, 6–13 (1997); Robert 
O’Malley, Ethics Principles for the Insurer, the Insured, and Defense Counsel: The Eternal 
Triangle Reformed, 66 TUL. L. REV. 511, 512–16 (1991); Stephen L. Pepper, Applying the 
Fundamentals of Lawyers’ Ethics to Insurance Defense Practice, 4 CONN. INS. L.J. 27, 51–71 
(1997); Ellen S. Pryor & Charles Silver, Defense Lawyers’ Professional Responsibilities: Part I – 
Excess Exposure Cases, 78 TEX. L. REV. 599, 614–17 (2000); Ellen S. Pryor & Charles Silver, 
Defense Lawyers’ Professional Responsibilities: Part II – Contested Coverage Cases, 15 GEO. J. 
LEGAL ETHICS 29, 33 (2001); Douglas R. Richmond, Lost in the Eternal Triangle of Insurance 
Defense Ethics, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 475, 492–96 (1996); Charles Silver, Does Insurance 
Defense Counsel Represent the Company or the Insured?, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1583, 1602–14 (1994); 
Charles Silver & Kent Syverud, The Professional Responsibilities of Insurance Defense Lawyers, 
45 DUKE L.J. 255, 273–80 (1995). This Article considers only one leg of the triangle, namely, the 
relationship between the investor and the funded client (in most cases, the plaintiff). A separate 
and important issue is the effect of the legal relationship with another party, such as a lawyer, 
on the duties owed on the recipient-funder leg of the triangle. For an analysis of these effects, see 
W. Bradley Wendel, A Legal Ethics Perspective on Alternative Litigation Financing, CAN. BUS. L. 
J. (forthcoming 2013) (on file with author). 
 7. Compare John C. Coffee, Jr., Litigation Governance: Taking Accountability Seriously, 
110 COLUM. L. REV. 288, 289 (2010) (advocating for a governance, not rule-bound, perspective on 
the problems inherent in class action and aggregate litigation), with Martin H. Redish, Class 
Actions and the Democratic Difficulty: Rethinking the Intersection of Private Litigation and 
Public Goals, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 71, 129–37 (2003) (advocating various new rules for 
controlling problems inherent in class action and aggregate litigation). 
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monitoring the other party’s performance is excessive.8 On the other 
hand, sequential performance is itself a means that can protect 
against various forms of misbehavior. As a matter of contract law, the 
search for default rules, which the parties may contract around, must 
be sensitive to the incentives created by the transaction itself, the 
parties’ bargain, and other legal rules. 
We will argue that contract law is better suited than regulation 
or tort liability to minimize both parties’ risks inherent in litigation 
investment. However, since litigation investment is not a one-off 
interaction between the parties, it should be understood as a 
relational contract, in which the parties’ respective rights and duties 
are not set in stone ex ante but evolve over time and may be adjusted 
as circumstances change.9 The legal regulation of litigation 
investment should not only protect the parties against opportunistic 
behavior but should also avoid disrupting an efficient outcome. 
Importantly, the parties’ agreement—actual or hypothetical (in the 
case of duties of good faith)—is the baseline against which legal duties 
and remedies should be measured. The contract structures the legal 
 
 8. See, e.g., Clayton P. Gillette, Commercial Relationships and the Selection of Default 
Rules for Remote Risks, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 535, 538–39 (1990) (explaining that parties are better 
able to seek redress for conduct that violates the contractual relationship when formalistic 
doctrines, like the duty of good faith, govern the agreement); Robert E. Scott, Conflict and 
Cooperation in Long-Term Contracts, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 2005, 2015 (1987) (stating that risk-
bearing assessments in contractual relationships necessitate consideration of the costs of 
subsequently monitoring and enforcing contractual assignments). 
 9. The literature on long-term and relational contracting is extensive. See, e.g., Jay M. 
Feinman, The Significance of Contract Theory, 58 U. CIN. L. REV. 1283, 1299–1304 (1990); 
Clayton P. Gillette, Commercial Rationality and the Duty to Adjust Long-Term Contracts, 69 
MINN. L. REV. 521, 533–52 (1985); Robert W. Gordon, Macaulay, Macneil, and the Discovery of 
Solidarity and Power in Contract Law, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 565, 571–79; Gidon Gottlieb, 
Relationism: Legal Theory for a Relational Society, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 567, 585–93 (1983); Gillian 
K. Hadfield, Problematic Relations: Franchising and the Law of Incomplete Contracts, 42 STAN. 
L. REV. 927, 946–48 (1990); Oliver Hart & John Moore, Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation, 
56 ECONOMETRICA 755, 755–57 (1988); Robert A. Hillman, Court Adjustment of Long-Term 
Contracts: An Analysis Under Modern Contract Law, 1987 DUKE L.J. 1, 4–14; Robert A. Hillman, 
The Crisis in Modem Contract Theory, 67 TEX. L. REV. 103, 123–27 (1988); Stewart Macaulay, An 
Empirical View of Contract, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 465, 471–77; Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual 
Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. SOC. REV. 55, 66–67 (1963); Ian R. Macneil, 
Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations Under Classical, Neoclassical, and 
Relational Contract Law, 72 NW. U. L. REV. 854, 886–900 (1978); Ian R. Macneil, The Many 
Futures of Contract, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 691, 735–44 (1974); Ian R. Macneil, Values in Contract: 
Internal and External, 78 NW. U. L. REV. 340, 397–416 (1983) [hereinafter Macneil, Internal and 
External]; Scott, supra note 8, at 2012–18; G. Richard Shell, Opportunism and Trust in the 
Negotiation of Commercial Contracts: Toward a New Cause of Action, 44 VAND. L. REV. 221, 228–
32 (1991); Richard E. Speidel, The Characteristics and Challenges of Relational Contracts, 94 
NW. U. L. REV. 823, 827–31 (2000); Richard E. Speidel, Court-Imposed Price Adjustments Under 
Long-Term Supply Contracts, 76 NW. U. L. REV. 369, 400–04 (1981); Richard E. Speidel, The New 
Spirit of Contract, 2 J.L. & COM. 193, 199–208 (1982). 
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relationship, subject to an overarching implied norm of mutual good 
faith and fair dealing throughout the performance of the contract.10 
The good faith duty does not prevent the parties from contracting 
around various default rules, which is to say that extracontractual 
norms should play relatively little role in regulating commercial 
litigation investment. Courts, however, may interpret the parties’ 
bargain in light of the course of dealing between the parties and, 
perhaps, trade custom, as long as courts are attempting to understand 
the agreement itself, not applying freestanding norms of 
reasonableness or good faith. We base our proposal, which makes 
contract law central to protecting the parties’ interests after they form 
the litigation agreement, on our close examination of the bilateral 
risks associated with litigation investment. 
The following points, which we expand upon in Part II, briefly 
summarize the ways in which the shared ownership of a legal claim 
may harm one party and, as a result of existing law, further may lead 
to inefficient or abusive conduct by both parties: 
(1) Information asymmetry. Duties of confidentiality and 
concerns about waiving the attorney-client privilege may impede full 
information sharing among the parties.11 Claim holders have the 
 
 10. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1981) (“Every contract imposes upon 
each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its performance and its enforcement.”). The 
strong claim of relational contract theorists is that contracts are irrelevant in long-term 
commercial relationships. See, e.g., ROBERT A. HILLMAN, THE RICHNESS OF CONTRACT LAW: AN 
ANALYSIS AND CRITIQUE OF CONTEMPORARY THEORIES OF CONTRACT LAW 256–66 (Aleksander 
Peczenik & Frederick Schauer eds., 1997) (explaining that contract law fails to acknowledge that 
minds rarely meet at a single time with regard to important contract terms and that, instead, 
parties rely on relational norms like flexibility and solidarity to govern their written 
agreements). More traditionalist-minded contract scholars respond that the implied term of good 
faith and fair dealing creates sufficient flexibility within a contract to allow the parties to adjust 
the terms of their relationship in a long-term interaction. See, e.g., id. at 143–52 (stating that 
judges use good faith as a safety valve to ensure minimum levels of fairness in contracting). We 
use the term “relational contract” here in its sociological sense to identify a long-term commercial 
relationship without suggesting a normative implication that contract law is irrelevant.  
 11. The attorney-client privilege protects confidential communications between a lawyer 
and client made for the purpose of obtaining or providing legal assistance to the client. 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 68 (2000). It is therefore considerably 
narrower than the duty of confidentiality recognized in the rules of professional conduct for 
lawyers, which cover (in most states) all information relating to representation of the client. See 
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a) (“A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to 
the representation of a client unless the client gives informed consent . . . .”). If an investor seeks 
access to communications protected by the attorney-client privilege, there is a risk that sharing 
those communications will waive the privilege. There is some uncertainty in the law regarding 
the application to litigation funding of the common-interest exception to this waiver doctrine. 
See, e.g., Leader Techs., Inc. v. Facebook, Inc., 719 F. Supp. 2d 373, 376–78 (D. Del. 2010) 
(declining to apply the common-interest exception to communications shared with a litigation 
investor). Arguably, the Leader Technologies case was wrongly decided, as some authority 
permits the sharing of communication as long as it is related to a common “legal, factual, or 
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opportunity to conceal bad facts in order to induce a substantial 
investment, knowing that the investor will then bear much of the risk 
of a negative litigation outcome. Withholding information may also 
enable a claim owner to capture more upside potential if the investor 
is unaware of facts suggesting that a claim is a particularly attractive 
investment. Investors, therefore, must expend resources on due 
diligence in order to avoid financing a losing claim.12 
(2) Shirking. A plaintiff may have an incentive to take the 
money and run, refusing to cooperate in prosecuting the litigation and 
thereby destroying the value of the investor’s asset. A setback during 
the litigation process may cause the claim owner to lose interest even 
though some value may remain in the claim. In the liability insurance 
context, contractual duties of cooperation require the insured to 
participate actively in the defense of the litigation. Litigation-
investment contracts may similarly require funded claimants to 
 
strategic” interest. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 76 cmt. e 
(emphasis added); see Douglas R. Richmond, Other People’s Money: The Ethics of Litigation 
Funding, 56 MERCER L. REV. 649, 675–76 (2005) (arguing for application of the common-interest 
exception to litigation-investment transactions). Documents and other tangible things covered by 
the work-product protection may be shared more freely with litigation investors. Work-product 
protection is waived only where covered materials are disclosed to third parties “in 
circumstances in which there is a significant likelihood that an adversary in litigation will obtain 
the materials.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 91 cmt. b. The client 
may give informed consent to the sharing of information covered by the duty of confidentiality 
(which a fortiori includes attorney-client privileged communications and work product material). 
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R.1.6(a). Reasonable care requires lawyers to advise clients of 
the risk of privilege waiver when sharing privileged communications with others. See AM. BAR 
ASS’N COMM’N ON ETHICS 20/20, INFORMATIONAL REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES 24–25 
(2011), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/ethics_2020/ 
20111212_ethics_20_20_alf_white_paper_final_hod_informational_report.authcheckdam.pdf 
(explaining that a typical state bar ethics limitation covers lawyers warning clients about the 
risk of waiving the attorney-client privilege). 
 12. See, e.g., Molot, Litigation Risk, supra note 3, at 389–90 (explaining that when given the 
choice between losing a deal, leaving a deal behind in escrow for the lawsuit’s duration, or paying 
a premium to third-party litigation insurers, investors could reasonably prefer to pay the 
premium). Maya Steinitz argues that litigation investment is analogous to venture capital (“VC”) 
funding, observing that VC funds use diversification to mitigate risk. See Maya Steinitz, The 
Litigation Finance Contract, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 455, 480 (2012) (“Like VC[ funds], which 
create and manage portfolios of high risk in potentially high-return companies, litigation finance 
firms develop portfolios of high-risk, high-return litigations.”). While commercial litigation-
investment funds may seek a diversified portfolio of investments, at present time, at least in the 
United States, these funds do not have a sufficient number of active investments at any one time 
to benefit significantly from diversification. Individualized due diligence is therefore an essential 
aspect of commercial litigation investment. Steinitz argues that there is more of a track record of 
performance regarding companies as opposed to legal claims. Id. at 481. That may be so with 
respect to some companies and some legal claims, but other legal claims, including the 
Ecuadorian litigation she uses as a case study, have progressed far enough that there is a 
lengthy paper trail of discovery and pleadings that can be used by an investor to evaluate the 
claim. See id. at 465–79. 
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cooperate in the prosecution of the lawsuit. Like all such contractual 
obligations, the investor may incur monitoring costs, which are 
exacerbated by the reluctance of claimants and their counsel to share 
communications covered by the attorney-client privilege. In the 
absence of due diligence, the parties may have to agree to various 
monitoring and bonding mechanisms to assure each other that they 
will not undermine the value of the shared asset.13 
(3) Control. A plaintiff’s incentives are not always aligned with 
those of a third-party investor. A settlement that the plaintiff might 
accept in the absence of third-party funding, for example, may be 
disadvantageous to the investor. Similarly, a plaintiff may prefer to 
proceed to trial notwithstanding a favorable settlement offer, knowing 
that a litigation-funding agreement has covered the expenses to that 
point, in effect gambling with the investor’s money. Knowing ex ante 
of this possibility, as well as the problem of shirking discussed 
previously, the parties may prefer to agree that the investor has the 
right to participate in important strategic decisions relating to the 
litigation, including whether to accept a settlement offer. In the 
liability insurance context, the contract allocates the right to settle to 
the nonlitigant (the insurer), subject to duties of good faith.14 In the 
litigation-investment context, however, this approach contains some 
legal risks. Courts may deem the investment contract voidable ex post 
as champerty15 or deem the investor to have a fiduciary relationship 
 
 13. See Daniel R. Fischel, The Economics of Lender Liability, 99 YALE L.J. 131, 136 (1989) 
(explaining that because higher interest rates are demanded when anticipated debtor 
misconduct is high, borrowers can allay these concerns by agreeing to monitoring or bonding 
mechanisms, such as providing lenders with periodic financial information or personal 
guarantees for the loan). 
 14. See Kent D. Syverud, The Duty to Settle, 76 VA. L. REV. 1113, 1118 (1990) (discussing 
the duty-to-settle doctrine and the insurer’s control over the settlement decision in a typical 
liability insurance contract). 
 15. Champerty is maintaining a suit in return for a financial interest in the outcome. 
Osprey, Inc. v. Cabana Ltd. P’ship, 532 S.E.2d 269, 273 (S.C. 2000) (quoting In re Primus, 436 
U.S. 412, 424 n.15 (1978)). Champerty is prohibited in almost half of American jurisdictions. 
Anthony J. Sebok, The Inauthentic Claim, 64 VAND. L. REV. 61, 98–99 (2011); see Stephen 
Gillers, Waiting for Good Dough: Litigation Funding Comes to Law, 43 AKRON L. REV. 677, 684–
85 (2010). Gillers discusses the notorious case of Rancman v. Interim Settlement Funding Corp., 
789 N.E.2d 217, 218, 220–21 (Ohio 2003), which invalidated a litigation-funding contract largely 
due to its effect on the parties’ incentives to settle. See Gillers, supra, at 682–86; see also Weaver, 
Bennett & Bland, P.A. v. Speedy Bucks, Inc., 162 F. Supp. 2d 448, 451 (W.D.N.C. 2001) 
(explaining that funding created a disincentive to settle for less than $1.2 million, so plaintiff 
refused a $1 million settlement offer); Kraft v. Mason, 668 So. 2d 679, 682 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1996) (defining prohibited champerty in terms of “officious intermeddling” by a third party). The 
law in other jurisdictions, notably Australia, permits the parties to agree by contract that a 
third-party investor can make decisions relating to litigation strategy. See Campbells Cash & 
Carry Pty Ltd v Fostif Pty Ltd (2006) 229 CLR 386 ¶ 88 (refusing to hold that a third-party 
investor’s control over litigation was contrary to public policy). See generally Jasminka Kalajdzic 
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with the claimant by virtue of the extent of control assumed over the 
conduct of the litigation.16 
(4) Opportunities foregone. In any contract, the parties decide 
at the outset how to allocate risks and opportunities. As the 
relationship unfolds, one of the parties may come to regret the 
decisions it made at the outset.17 In a litigation-investment contract, 
for example, the investor may have captured a large but relatively 
unlikely upside opportunity in exchange for presently funding the 
lawsuit. If the investor realizes a sizeable return on its investment 
from a substantial verdict at trial, the claim owner may regret 
relinquishing this upside opportunity and seek to void the agreement. 
In most cases, contract law will regard this tactic as impermissible 
double-dipping because the owner already obtained the benefit of the 
bargain by receiving an amount certain when the agreement was 
formed. There may be a few situations, however, in which a 
subsequent change in circumstances was both unforeseeable at the 
outset and material to the commercial relationship between the 
parties. In that case, contract law might allow one of the parties to 
reform the contract. 
By emphasizing the contract as fundamental, we wish to 
emphasize that the parties’ commercial interaction is not the kind of 
special relationship that creates tort- or agency-law duties. Part III.A 
takes up this argument. Because the norm of good faith and fair 
dealing is rooted in the parties’ bargain, contract law, not tort law, 
determines whether bad faith conduct within a litigation-funding 
relationship is actionable. Despite the linguistic homonymy, breach of 
an implied term of good faith in a contract is not the same thing as 
freestanding tort bad faith,18 nor is it equivalent to breach of a 
fiduciary duty.19 A litigation investor is not obligated to act solely in 
 
et al., Justice for Profit: A Comparative Analysis of Australian, Canadian and U.S. Third Party 
Litigation Funding, 61 AM. J. COMP. L. 93, 93 (2013) (exploring third-party litigation funding in 
the United States, Australia, and Canada). 
 16. Fiduciary duties are discussed infra Part III, when we discuss Powers’s explanation for 
why bad faith claims in third-party insurance contracts are handled under tort.  
 17. See Anthony T. Kronman, Paternalism and the Law of Contracts, 92 YALE L.J. 763, 
780–86 (1983) (discussing reasons a person may regret making a contract). 
 18. See, e.g., Roger C. Henderson, The Tort of Bad Faith in First-Party Insurance 
Transactions After Two Decades, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 1153, 1156 (1995) (suggesting that the term for 
the liability of insurers to their insureds for emotional distress and other consequential damages 
was inspired by the contract doctrine of good faith, but the appropriation of this label caused 
definitional problems and confusion from the outset). 
 19. As discussed at length in Part III.C, the duty of good faith between the parties that 
arises as part of any contract is not the same thing as either a fiduciary duty, as would exist in a 
partnership or trusteeship relationship (or, for that matter, in the attorney-client relationship), 
or the kind of duty that gives rise to a tort cause of action, as would be the case in a third-party 
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the interests of the claim holder, nor is the claim holder obligated to 
act solely in the interests of the investor. It is consistent with the 
contractual duty of good faith for the parties to act solely in their own 
interests.20 For similar reasons, an analogy between the litigation-
investment contract and a joint venture, partnership, or other type of 
fiduciary commercial relationship fails.21 In brief, the litigation-
investment relationship is an ordinary, arm’s length commercial 
transaction subject to the usual contractual duties of good faith but 
not governed by fiduciary norms. 
Comparing the development of contract and tort actions for bad 
faith in insurance cases,22 we will further argue that tort bad faith is 
appropriate in some insurance relationships, specifically with respect 
to third-party (liability) insurance, but not others, specifically first-
party insurance. Bad faith in the first-party context is an instance of a 
familiar problem in contract law. The parties contemplate ex ante the 
harms that result from breach and thus can bargain over appropriate 
breach-related remedies. By contrast, a betrayal of trust in the third-
 
insurance contract. See infra Part III.C. “[A] decreasing number of courts allow plaintiffs to 
exploit the vagueness of ‘bad faith’ to obtain redress for a generalized misfortune caused by the 
defendant’s disagreeable conduct.” STEVEN J. BURTON & ERIC G. ANDERSON, CONTRACTUAL GOOD 
FAITH: FORMATION, PERFORMANCE, BREACH, ENFORCEMENT, at xxi (1995). It will be clear in the 
discussion that follows that we are arguing that courts do, and should, recognize an implied term 
of good faith and fair dealing as part of any litigation-investment contract, but this is not the 
same as a free-floating norm of good faith that arises as a matter of law, i.e., in tort. 
 20. See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Mandatory/Enabling Balance in Corporate Law: An Essay 
on the Judicial Role, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1618, 1658 (1989) (“[A] contracting party may seek to 
advance his own interests in good faith while a fiduciary may not . . . .”). 
 21. See E. Allan Farnsworth, Your Loss or My Gain? The Dilemma of the Disgorgement 
Principle in Breach of Contract, 94 YALE L.J. 1339, 1357–60 (1985) (discussing problems with 
analogizing fiduciary relationships to contractual relationships). 
 22. See, e.g., Tom Baker, Constructing the Insurance Relationship: Sales Stories, Claims 
Stories and Insurance Contract Damages, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1395, 1397–400 (1994) (discussing 
compensatory damages in insurers’ good faith and bad faith denials of claims and examining the 
stories insurers tell when marketing their services versus the stories they tell when handling 
claims); Jay M. Feinman, The Insurance Relationship as Relational Contract and the “Fairly 
Debatable” Rule for First-Party Bad Faith, 46 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 553, 554 (2009) (discussing 
relational contract theory and illustrating its application to the problem of the standard being 
applied in first-party bad faith cases); Henderson, supra note 18, at 1153–56 (discussing the 
evolution of the law regarding the obligations of an insurer in a first-party situation); Roger C. 
Henderson, The Tort of Bad Faith in First-Party Insurance Transactions: Refining the Standard 
of Culpability and Reformulating the Remedies by Statute, 26 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1, 4 (1992) 
(exploring the common-law and statutory background of the tort of bad faith in insurance 
situations and analyzing courts’ varying standards of culpability); Douglas R. Richmond, An 
Overview of Insurance Bad Faith Law and Litigation, 25 SETON HALL L. REV. 74, 76 (1994) 
(broadly examining bad faith law and litigation); Alan O. Sykes, “Bad Faith” Breach of Contract 
by First-Party Insurers, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 405, 405 (1996) (discussing extracontractual damages 
as a solution to bad faith breach by insurers); Sharon Tennyson & William J. Warfel, The Law 
and Economics of First-Party Insurance Bad Faith Liability, 16 CONN. INS. L.J. 203, 203 (2009) 
(discussing states’ varying approaches to bad faith law in first-party insurance). 
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party context exposes the betrayed party to particularly devastating 
harms, with damages that are impossible to predict ex ante. 
Section III.B argues that a litigation-investment transaction is 
a long-term commercial relationship in which the parties share 
ownership of an asset in circumstances that create risks for both 
parties. A cause of action is an asset whose value can be affected by 
the actions of the claimant and the claimant’s lawyer.23 Commercial 
litigation-investment transactions generally involve transferring 
money in a lump-sum payment or, more commonly, in a series of 
payments, to the claimant in exchange for a share of the proceeds of 
the litigation.24 As a result, the claimant and the investor share 
ownership of an asset. As with many instances of divided ownership 
rights, each co-owner faces the risk that the other owner or owners 
will do something, or fail to do something, that has an asymmetric 
effect on the asset’s value.25 Divided ownership enables one of the 
parties to engage in opportunistic behavior, a risk that legal rules may 
either mitigate, as with the doctrine of waste, or exacerbate, as with 
the rule of capture.26 
These risks are specific to the interaction between the parties 
and not susceptible to generalized treatment ex ante as a matter of 
tort law. Notwithstanding the dependence of the parties’ mutual 
rights and duties on an underlying agreement, it would be a mistake 
to search for a single moment in time when the parties definitively 
established all of the terms of an agreement.27 Uncertainty over the 
effect of contract terms increases with the duration of the investment, 
which means that parties investing in complex litigation will have 
difficulty planning and allocating risks at the outset. They accordingly 
may need to rely on the standard-like norms of good faith and fair 
dealing within a contractual allocation of rights and responsibilities. 
 
 23. See Maya Steinitz, How Much Is That Lawsuit in the Window? Pricing Legal Claims, 67 
VAND. L. REV. 1887 (2013) (proposing that the solution to the problem of pricing legal claims in 
third-party-funding agreements lies with staged funding). 
 24. See GARBER, supra note 2, at 15. 
 25. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW §§ 3.9–3.10, at 72–86 (5th 
ed. 1998); Ian Ayres & Eric Talley, Solomonic Bargaining: Dividing a Legal Entitlement to 
Facilitate Coasean Trade, 104 YALE L.J. 1027, 1029 (1995) (considering the effects of splitting an 
entitlement between buyers and sellers); Richard A. Epstein, Past and Future: The Temporal 
Dimension in the Law of Property, 64 WASH. U. L.Q. 667, 717 (1986) (discussing how, in the 
context of condominiums and cooperatives, a unanimity requirement between coowners invites 
opportunistic behavior). 
 26. See generally Bruce M. Kramer & Owen L. Anderson, The Rule of Capture—An Oil and 
Gas Perspective, 35 ENVTL. L. 899, 899–900 (2005) (discussing the rule of capture used in 
determining ownership of oil and gas). 
 27. See Ian R. Macneil, Commentary, Restatement (Second) of Contracts and Presentiation, 
60 VA. L. REV. 589, 594 (1974) (stating contract law cannot achieve total presentiation). 
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Implied terms of good faith should be understood with reference to the 
parties’ actual bargain, however, and not defined against freestanding 
duties of reasonableness. Certain instances of exploitation or 
opportunistic behavior may give rise to contractual liability for breach 
of an implied term of good faith. But again, the touchstone for 
evaluating opportunism is the parties’ agreement, including the 
opportunities foregone by each party as a result of the bargain.28 In a 
commercial litigation-investment contract, neither party will likely be 
in a vulnerable position prior to the bargaining process. If an 
improvident bargain makes one party vulnerable, well, that is just the 
risk that sophisticated parties run when they enter into contracts. To 
put it another way, the litigation-investment relationship is not an 
inherently fiduciary one in which the parties are subject to a duty of 
overriding good faith—“[n]ot honesty alone, but the punctilio of an 
honor the most sensitive,” as Judge Cardozo famously put it.29 Nor do 
the reasons supporting fiduciary duties in the third-party-insurance 
context apply to litigation-investment contracts. The duties of good 
faith that the parties owe to each other are defined in relation to the 
agreement of the parties; the duties are not free-floating tort-type 
duties that arise as a matter of law. The hypothetical transaction 
considered in the next part illustrates the parties’ mutual risks in the 
context of a litigation-investment contract.30 
 
 28. See Fischel, supra note 13, at 138 (“Opportunistic behavior occurs whenever one party 
attempts to obtain, at the expense of the other, a benefit not contemplated by the initial 
agreement, either explicitly or implicitly.”). The definition of opportunistic behavior in terms of 
opportunities foregone as part of the initial agreement is at the core of Burton’s definition of 
contractual good faith. See Steven J. Burton, Breach of Contract and the Common Law Duty to 
Perform in Good Faith, 94 HARV. L. REV. 369, 373 (1980) (stating bad faith performance occurs 
when discretion is used to capture opportunities forgone as part of the initial agreement). 
 29. Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928) (explaining that “[a] trustee is held 
to something stricter than the morals of the market place”). The California Supreme Court 
explained the difference between fiduciary relationships and ordinary commercial relationships 
as follows: 
The relationship of seller to buyer is not one ordinarily vested with fiduciary 
obligation. . . . In such transactions, the seller is held to the mores of the marketplace. 
A fiduciary, by contrast, assumes duties beyond those of mere fairness and honesty in 
marketing its product—he must undertake to act on behalf of the beneficiary, giving 
priority to the best interest of the beneficiary. 
Comm. on Children’s Television, Inc. v. Gen. Foods Corp., 673 P.2d 660, 676 (Cal. 1983) (citation 
omitted). 
 30. This hypothetical is drawn from the authors’ experience but is not modeled after any 
particular deal.  
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II. TYPOLOGY OF RISKS IN LITIGATION INVESTMENT 
To demonstrate our argument that commercial litigation-
investment agreements should be viewed as a species of relational 
contracts, we offer in this part a highly stylized example of a 
transaction that reflects many (if not all) of the bilateral risks 
associated with litigation investment. We would like to stress that the 
following example is merely a heuristic; not only is it unlikely that the 
parties would behave as described below, but some of the contract 
terms bargained for are highly unusual, although they are not, we 
believe, so farfetched as to be completely outside the range of 
possibility.31 
A. Hypothetical Transaction 
The underlying claim. Owner has a claim against his business 
partner, Partner, arising out of Partner’s alleged breach of the 
partnership agreement. Owner seeks both money damages and an 
injunction against Partner to prevent Partner from competing in the 
same field (smartphone-application development) for two years. The 
basis for the injunction is a noncompete clause in the partnership 
agreement. Because much of Owner’s wealth is tied up in the 
partnership, the assets of which are the subject of the dispute, Owner 
cannot afford to pay a sophisticated law firm to handle the litigation 
on an hourly basis. The allegations of breach involve Partner’s use of 
partnership-owned technology to develop a competing line of 
smartphone apps, so it is foreseeable that the litigation will be 
expensive and involve substantial fees for expert witnesses. The local 
lawyers who handle cases on a contingent fee basis are unfamiliar 
with this type of litigation and therefore unwilling to represent 
Owner. Faced with the prospect of being unable to finance what he 
reasonably believes to be a meritorious lawsuit, Owner approached a 
litigation-investment firm, Investor, about purchasing a share of 
Owner’s claim against Partner. 
Preferences regarding outcomes. In the course of the 
negotiations with Investor, Owner told Investor that the potential 
damages recovery is important, but it is far more important to obtain 
an injunction against Partner’s future competition in the app 
industry. Owner said that the injunction is so central that he would 
not consider bringing a suit against Partner unless he was reasonably 
 
 31. We also would like to stress that the illustration is not based on an actual litigation-
investment contract.  
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sure that he would get the injunction. Indeed, if it were not possible to 
obtain an injunction, Owner would prefer to “lump it,” by staying in 
the business partnership with Partner, whom he hates. Nevertheless, 
as long as it is possible to obtain damages without foregoing the 
possibility of an injunction, Owner said he would prefer to receive a 
large damages award, as he believes an infusion of capital is necessary 
to develop and market a promising new series of apps.32 Upon hearing 
this, the president of Investor concluded that Owner’s preference for 
an injunction was not absolute and that Investor could persuade 
Owner to accept a substantial settlement offer including only 
monetary relief. “Everyone has his price,” thought the president. 
Owner did not tell Investor that he was an extremely risk-averse 
person by nature and would have a very hard time foregoing a certain 
present advantage in exchange for the possibility of a substantial 
future gain. 
The investment agreement. Owner and Investor reached an 
agreement under which Investor would make an initial investment of 
$500,000 in exchange for 20% of the amount recovered by way of 
judgment or settlement. Under the contract, Investor’s recovery 
percentage increases with the passage of time since the initial 
investment so that Investor’s share goes to 30% after one year, 40% 
after eighteen months, 50% after two years, and so on. The contract 
provides that Owner has an option to request future contributions by 
Investor in exchange for an increased share of the recovery, but 
Investor has no obligation to make future contributions. The first-
round investment and all subsequent contributions are contingent 
upon the completion of due diligence by Investor, using a law firm 
selected by Investor. The outside law firm and Owner agreed to 
execute a common-interest agreement, providing that any information 
disclosed by Owner will be held in strictest confidence and that 
neither Owner nor the outside firm intend to waive the attorney-client 
privilege in any confidential communications between Owner and 
Owner’s litigation counsel. Owner and Investor agreed that they will 
consult about the litigation firm that Owner will retain as counsel in 
the suit against Partner, and Owner will not enter into a retainer 
agreement without the consent of Investor, consent not to be 
unreasonably withheld. Owner promised to use funds received from 
Investor solely for the purpose of paying the expenses of litigation, 
 
 32. In other words, Owner’s preference for an injunction is lexically prior to the preference 
for any amount of money. The two outcomes are incommensurable from Owner’s point of view.  
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including fees for attorneys and experts.33 Owner also undertook to 
keep Investor reasonably informed of the status of the litigation and to 
consult with Investor about important tactical decisions, including the 
scope of claims to be pursued, the extent and timing of discovery, 
motions to be filed, and so on. Finally, Owner and Investor agreed that 
Owner will inform Investor of any offers of settlement, will consult 
with Investor about whether to accept a settlement offer, and will not 
enter into a settlement agreement or a dismissal with prejudice of the 
lawsuit without obtaining Investor’s consent. 
Relationship with Owner’s counsel. After consultation with 
Investor, Owner retained a sophisticated commercial-litigation firm, 
Law Firm, to represent him, agreeing to pay Law Firm on an hourly 
basis.34 Prior to signing the engagement agreement, however, Owner 
did not inform the lead lawyer from Law Firm on the case, Lawyer, 
about the agreement with Investor. When she later learned of the 
investment contract, two provisions of the agreement troubled 
Lawyer: the due diligence to be conducted by a separate law firm and 
the contractual assignment to Investor of the right to accept or reject 
settlement offers. After consultation with Law Firm’s in-house general 
counsel, Lawyer requested that Owner give informed consent for 
Lawyer to disclose information to Investor protected by Lawyer’s 
professional duty of confidentiality,35 and Owner readily agreed. On 
the issue of settlement and control, Lawyer informed Owner that she 
had an obligation to exercise independent professional judgment and 
render candid advice,36 and that Owner retained the authority to 
make decisions regarding settlement. Owner responded that he had 
decided to delegate this authority to Investor by contract and was 
willing ex ante to trust that Investor would make a decision relating 
to settlement that was in Owner’s best interests. Reasoning that she 
had no professional obligations to Investor and that she would get 
paid in any event, Lawyer somewhat reluctantly agreed to represent 
Owner, knowing of the contract with Investor. Lawyer did inform 
Owner, however, that as a matter of agency law she retained the 
 
 33. Counsel for Investor structured the contract in this way to avoid the risk that a direct 
payment of attorneys’ fees could be seen as compromising the independent professional judgment 
of the attorneys representing Owner. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8(f) (2013) 
(stating a lawyer must not accept compensation for representing a client from someone other 
than the client). 
 34. The agreement between Owner and Law Firm thus avoids the problem of fee-splitting, 
which makes litigation-investment contracts complex in contingent fee representation. See 
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.4(a) (stating a lawyer must not share fees with a 
nonlawyer).  
 35. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a).  
 36. Id. R. 2.1. 
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authority to make certain decisions, regardless of the Owner-Investor 
contract.37 
Settlement inflection point. Investor transferred $500,000 to 
Owner as the first tranche of funding under the agreement. Owner 
used $250,000 to establish a retainer with Law Firm as an advance 
payment against future legal services.38 He used the rest to pay for a 
lavish vacation in Thailand with his family, including transportation 
on a private jet. The litigation proceeded through discovery and a 
round of dispositive motions. All appeared to be going well for Owner 
when the trial court denied Partner’s motion for summary judgment 
on Owner’s claim for breach of fiduciary duty. Eleven months after the 
initial disbursement to Owner, Partner offered to settle for $4 million 
and a license to use partnership-owned technology in apps to be 
developed separately. Owner informed both Lawyer and Investor of 
this settlement offer. Lawyer advised Owner that the offer was an 
extremely attractive one. She reported that Partner’s $4 million offer 
included a significant premium to avoid the restriction on competition. 
Partner believed that he would be able to finance a substantial 
settlement based on the market potential of technology he was 
developing, but this would not be possible if he were restricted from 
working in the industry for two years. Lawyer further stated that, in 
her judgment, it would be extremely difficult to obtain injunctions 
against future competition under state partnership law because courts 
prefer to award money damages for breach. Thus, if Owner insisted 
upon going to trial, he would not only risk losing the $4 million 
settlement amount, but also would be highly unlikely to obtain an 
injunction. (Lawyer conveyed to Owner her estimate of the likelihood 
of obtaining an injunction as “7–10%, best case scenario.”) 
Nevertheless, as Lawyer pointed out, Owner ultimately had the 
authority to decide whether to accept the offer.39 Finally, Lawyer 
 
 37. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 23 (2000) (providing 
that, as a matter of agency law, as between the lawyer and client, the lawyer retains the 
authority to refuse to perform acts that are unlawful or contrary to the order of a tribunal). 
 38. See id. § 38 cmt. g (permitting retainers to secure advance fee payments). 
 39. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) (requiring lawyers to abide by client’s 
decision whether to settle a matter). Because Law Firm was compensated on an hourly basis, its 
only incentive to continue litigating was revenue from the ongoing hourly billing of Owner. If, on 
the other hand, Law Firm had a contingent fee agreement with Owner, it may have had an 
incentive either to (1) advise acceptance of the settlement offer, if its share of the proceeds 
divided by the hours expended to date yielded an effective hourly rate that exceeded what the 
firm could have realized by working on an hourly basis for other clients, or (2) advise rejection of 
the settlement offer if there were sufficient upside potential in a substantial recovery at trial. 
For a sophisticated analysis of the lawyer’s incentives under hourly and contingent fee 
structures, see Kevin M. Clermont & John D. Currivan, Improving on the Contingent Fee, 63 
CORNELL L. REV. 529, 534–37 (1978). 
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informed Owner that Law Firm had exhausted the retainer and would 
withdraw from representing Owner unless Owner replenished the 
retainer with another $250,000.40 Owner’s lavish vacation left him 
with no funds available with which to pay Law Firm and gave him no 
alternative other than to request another round of funding from 
Investor. 
Dénouement. At this point, eleven months had passed since 
Investor’s initial investment. Investor realized that if the litigation 
settled in the next month, its share of the recovery would be worth 
$800,000, but if the case settled later, Investor would be entitled to 
the increased one-year rate of 30% of the recovery, or $1.2 million. 
Thus, Investor requested “some time to study the issues” before 
making a decision regarding settlement. After the one-year rate-reset 
date had passed, Investor informed Owner that, in its judgment, the 
settlement offer was highly advantageous and should be accepted by 
Owner. Owner reminded Investor that his preference had always been 
for an injunction over damages, no matter how sizeable the damages 
award. He falsely told Investor that Lawyer had estimated the 
likelihood of obtaining an injunction at 40%. Owner also told Investor 
that he had exhausted the first tranche of funding and was requesting 
a second tranche in order to pay for the projected costs of litigation 
through trial. Investor responded that Owner would be permitted to 
reject the settlement offer, but that no further funds would be 
forthcoming. Without any means to pay for continued representation, 
Owner felt coerced into accepting the settlement, which he did. Owner 
received $2.8 million, and Investor received $1.2 million, yielding an 
approximately 42% return on its investment. Nevertheless, Owner 
was upset at foregoing the opportunity to obtain an injunction against 
Partner and felt that he had been “squeezed” by Investor’s decision to 
deny the second tranche of funding. The more he thought about it, the 
more distressed he became. He began to suffer from anxiety, 
sleeplessness, irritability, headaches, and nausea. He retained a tort 
lawyer on a contingent fee basis and filed a lawsuit against Investor 
alleging breach of contract, “bad faith,” breach of fiduciary duty, and 
intentional infliction of emotional distress, seeking punitive as well as 
compensatory damages. 
 
 40. A violation of numerous ethical obligations, but that is immaterial for present purposes. 
See ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 11-458 (2011), available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/11_458_
nm_formal_opinion.authcheckdam.pdf (stating that modification of an existing fee agreement is 
only permissible if the lawyer can show the modification was reasonable under the circumstances 
at the time and the modification was communicated to and accepted by the client). 
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This hypothetical, although somewhat exaggerated, illustrates 
many of the risks faced by the parties to a litigation-investment 
contract. The remainder of this Part discusses those risks in detail. 
Part III then considers the tort and contract remedies that someone in 
Owner’s position may assert and argues for a contract-based scheme of 
rights and remedies. 
B. The Varieties of Risk in Litigation Investment 
1. Information Asymmetry 
Private information tends to increase transaction costs. In the 
case of litigation investment, a party to litigation typically knows 
much more about facts affecting the claim’s value than does the 
party’s lawyer or a third-party investor. The likelihood of the claim’s 
success on the merits depends on many things, including the 
credibility of key witnesses, the existence of favorable documentary 
evidence, and even psychological factors, such as the party’s 
preferences with respect to risk (a risk-averse party being more 
willing, all things equal, to accept a low settlement offer than a risk-
neutral party). A lawyer deciding whether to represent a plaintiff 
pursuant to a contingent fee agreement must evaluate the strength of 
the plaintiff’s case based on limited information, but at least the 
attorney-client privilege protects the lawyer’s communications with 
the client from compelled disclosure. Though some have argued that 
lawyer-client communications may be shared with nonlawyer 
investors without waiving the attorney-client privilege, a leading case 
reached the opposite conclusion by finding the common-interest 
exception inapplicable.41 Even if the claimant’s lawyer believes that it 
would be in her client’s best interests to obtain funding from a 
litigation-investment firm, the lawyer will be obligated to counsel the 
client not to share any information under circumstances that could 
potentially waive the attorney-client privilege. 
In our hypothetical, Investor made it a condition of funding 
that Owner permit a due diligence investigation. Investor requested 
the right to use a law firm it selected to conduct the investigation, 
knowing that the litigation would involve complex intellectual 
property and business-law issues. Because a lawsuit had not yet been 
filed, Investor did not have the option to scrutinize pleadings and 
other litigation filings to determine the strength of Owner’s claims. 
 
 41. See supra note 11 (discussing Leader Techs., Inc. v. Facebook, Inc., 719 F. Supp. 2d 373, 
373 (D. Del. 2010)). 
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Investor suggested sharing confidential and potentially privileged 
information with the due diligence firm, and Lawyer agreed. 
Given the uncertainty over the application of the common-
interest doctrine, one might fault Lawyer for this decision, but the 
important point is that the law governing confidentiality and privilege 
potentially creates an impediment to the kind of information sharing 
that would allow Investor and Owner to reach an efficient outcome. 
Even a highly competent due diligence analysis, however, would not 
reveal all private information that might be necessary to reach such 
an outcome, including Owner’s risk aversion and the fact that his 
preference for an injunction over monetary damages was quite 
strongly held and unlikely to yield in the presence of a substantial 
monetary settlement offer. 
As the hypothetical case progressed, other information 
asymmetries developed. For example, Owner had access to Lawyer’s 
estimate of the likelihood of obtaining an injunction at trial. If Owner 
chose to remain mum about that likelihood, Investor could not force 
him to divulge the estimate. In our example, Owner lies about the 
estimate, which of course is another possibility when one party has 
private information. One way to avoid this sort of problem would be to 
recognize a dual attorney-client relationship so that Law Firm had a 
duty of communication with Investor as well as Owner. If that were 
the case, Law Firm would be obligated to “promptly comply with 
reasonable requests for information” from Investor.42 Lawyers tend to 
resist strongly the imposition of duties to a Client B or third party in 
addition to their ordinary professional obligations to Client A.43 The 
 
 42. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.4(a)(4). 
 43. See, e.g., Morgan, supra note 6, at 8–9 (discussing the difficulties a lawyer might face 
when representing both the insurance company and the insured and stating the one-client model 
is preferable); Pepper, supra note 6, at 28 (stating the one-client model is preferable). In the 
liability insurance–defense context, some states maintain that only the insured is the client of 
the lawyer, but even those states often recognize some duties running to the insurer, despite not 
acknowledging the insurer as fully a client for all purposes. See, e.g., Paradigm Ins. Co. v. 
Langerman Law Offices, 24 P.3d 593, 602 (Ariz. 2001) (holding that when an insurer retains an 
attorney for its insured, the attorney has a duty to the insurer that exists even when the insurer 
is not a client); Atlanta Int’l Ins. Co. v. Bell, 475 N.W.2d 294, 297 (Mich. 1991) (stating the 
relationship between the insurer and attorney for the insured is not an attorney-client 
relationship but is more than a mere commercial relationship); In re The Rules of Prof’l Conduct, 
2 P.3d 806, 821 (Mont. 2000) (stating that disclosures of billing statements to insurers are 
impliedly authorized in order to carry out representation); Nev. Yellow Cab Corp. v. Eighth Jud. 
Dist. Ct. ex rel. Clark, 152 P.3d 737, 739 (Nev. 2007) (holding that, in the absence of a conflict, 
counsel retained by an insurance company to represent its insured represents both the insurance 
company and the insured); Givens v. Mullikin ex rel. Estate of McElwaney, 75 S.W.3d 383, 395 
(Tenn. 2002) (stating that even though an insurance company lacks the right to control an 
attorney hired for the insured, it still might try to exercise actual control, but this does not 
become invidious until the attempted control creates conflicts of interest). See generally 4 
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absence of a dual attorney-client relationship heightens the risk 
presented by asymmetric information but may reduce other risks, 
such as the monitoring costs a client must expend to ensure that her 
attorney is not breaching an obligation because of divided loyalties.44 
2. Shirking 
In any relationship in which one party acts on behalf of 
another, the principal may have to expend time, effort, and money to 
ensure that the agent acts in the principal’s best interests and does 
not engage in shirking or other self-interested behavior.45 In an 
 
RONALD E. MALLEN & JEFFREY M. SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 30:3 (2009) (discussing the 
tripartite relationship between the insured, the insurer, and the defense counsel). 
 44. In theory, the problem of divided loyalties is handled by conflict-of-interest rules, 
particularly in this context. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7, 1.8(b), 1.8(f) 
(explaining how lawyers should behave regarding matters that could create conflicts of interest 
with their current clients). Virtually all conflict-of-interest prohibitions are waivable by the client 
if the client gives informed consent. As a matter of the intersection between insurance law and 
professional-responsibility norms, the insurance contract often operates as advance consent. The 
trouble is, the advance-consent argument only works if there are no conflicts of interest: “In a 
conflict-free situation, the purchase of a liability policy, containing such a provision [i.e., allowing 
the insurer to select counsel for the defense of the insured], has been held to be a prior consent 
by the insured to the dual representation.” MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 43, at 150 n.9. Because 
the dual-client situation presents problems only where conflicts of interest actually arise, the 
constructive advance waiver accomplished through the insurance policy does not really help. See, 
e.g., Swiss Reinsurance Am. Corp. v. Roetzel & Andress, 837 N.E.2d 1215, 1218–19, 1222–25 
(Ohio Ct. App. 2005) (holding that, under the circumstances, where there was a conflict of 
interest created by an excess-of-limits claim and an assertion of bad faith in failing to settle 
within limits, the insurer lacked standing to sue the lawyer for malpractice). Where conflicts 
arise, many jurisdictions fall back on either a single-client view or an implied priority given to 
the interests of the insured. The Givens case is one example. The Tennessee Supreme Court 
stated:  
While this practical reality raises significant potential for conflicts of interest, it does 
not become invidious until the attempted control seeks, either directly or indirectly, to 
affect the attorney’s independent professional judgment, to interfere with the 
attorney’s unqualified duty of loyalty to the insured, or to present “a reasonable 
possibility of advancing an interest that would differ [sic] from that of the insured.” 
75 S.W.3d at 395 (quoting Bd. of Prof’l Responsibility of the Supreme Court of Tenn., Formal 
Ethics Op. 2000-F-145, at 4 (2000), available at http://www.tbpr.org/Attorneys/ 
EthicsOpinions/Pdfs/2000-F-145.pdf). These cases show that the single-client vs. dual-client 
question, much debated in the literature, is in some ways of lesser importance than the question 
of what duties a lawyer owes to whom, regardless of whether the object of duties is regarded as a 
“client” or not.  
 45. See generally Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, An Analysis of the Principal-Agent 
Problem, 51 ECONOMETRICA 7, 18–29 (1983) (modeling optimal-incentive payment structure to 
minimize welfare loss stemming from a principal’s inability to monitor its agent’s actions); 
Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency 
Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308 (1976) (“The principal can limit 
divergences from his interest by establishing appropriate incentives for the agent and by 
incurring monitoring costs designed to limit the aberrant activities of the agent.”); Steven 
Shavell, Risk Sharing and Incentives in the Principal and Agent Relationship, 10 BELL J. ECON. 
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attorney-client relationship, for example, the client would prefer that 
the attorney invest the optimal amount of effort into the case to 
maximize its value to the client. At the same time, however, the 
attorney’s profit from working on the case varies based on the amount 
of time the attorney invests. Given opportunity costs, no rational 
attorney wishes to work more hours than necessary on any one client’s 
case.46 Under an hourly billing arrangement, the marginal value to 
the attorney of each additional hour stays constant even after there is 
a marginal decrease in the return to the client.47 An hourly 
arrangement thus incentivizes attorney effort above optimal levels. In 
a contingent fee arrangement, on the other hand, the client pays a 
fixed percentage regardless of hours worked, so the client’s interests 
are best served when the attorney devotes a large amount of time to 
working on the client’s case. Yet, the attorney has an incentive to work 
fewer hours to maximize the effective hourly rate obtained by working 
on the client’s matter.48 A contingent fee arrangement therefore leads 
to suboptimal levels of attorney effort. Ultimately, then, the client 
must incur costs in addition to attorney compensation to ensure 
optimal attorney investment. 
In our hypothetical, Investor attempted to mitigate the risk of 
shirking by setting up a series of smaller contributions rather than 
making a large, up-front investment. If Owner proved to be less than 
diligent in prosecuting the litigation, Investor could simply refuse to 
make further contributions. Investor also sought to have a role in 
making decisions related to the litigation by contractually requiring 
the Owner to consult with Investor about tactical decisions. Lawyer 
 
55, 55–57, 65–66 (1979) (applying principal-agent fee structures to negligence vs. strict liability 
legal regimes, insurance, lawyer-client relationships, and shareholder-management 
relationships). 
 46. See, e.g., Clermont & Currivan, supra note 39, at 535–36 (arguing that attorneys paid 
by the billable hour have no economic incentive to work optimal hours on a matter, while 
attorneys working for contingency are incentivized to minimize hours worked by accepting a 
suboptimal settlement); Bruce L. Hay, Contingent Fees and Agency Costs, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 503, 
518–20 (1996) (arguing that higher contingency percentages better incentivize lawyers to 
maximize client return when heavy investment of lawyer time is needed to approach the ceiling 
value of the claim); Geoffrey P. Miller, Some Agency Problems in Settlement, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 
189, 200–01 (1987) (showing that attorneys paid on contingent basis are incentivized to accept 
suboptimal settlements to avoid the extra time investment of trial); Murray L. Schwartz & 
Daniel J.B. Mitchell, An Economic Analysis of the Contingent Fee in Personal-Injury Litigation, 
22 STAN. L. REV. 1125, 1134–36 (1970) (arguing that attorneys paid on a contingent basis will 
invest time in a case until their expected profit from an additional hour of work falls to their 
market hourly billing rate). 
 47. See Clermont & Currivan, supra note 39, at 538–39 (reasoning that an assumption of 
diminishing marginal returns on lawyer hours worked is realistic since rational lawyers will 
prioritize the most pivotal tasks). 
 48. Id. at 543–46. 
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wisely distanced herself from any obligation to take instructions from 
Investor. If Owner directed Lawyer to do something that was both 
lawful and within Owner’s decisionmaking authority, however, 
Lawyer would have no grounds for refusing to follow her client’s 
instructions. 
In addition, Owner breached the contract by blowing $250,000 
of the funds on a trip to Thailand, which illustrates the risk in any 
case of shared ownership that one of the owners will act self-
interestedly and contrary to the interests of the other owner. 
Obviously, Investor would have preferred that Owner use the funds to 
pay the legal fees that would increase the value of Owner’s claim. 
Because monitoring Owner’s use of funds would be impractical, 
Investor considered making payments directly to Law Firm but 
decided against it because the law governing lawyers created too 
many complications. 
Similarly, Investor dithered for a while before responding to 
the settlement offer because delay would increase its percentage of 
recovery. That sort of conduct, if unexcused, would be an example of 
contractual bad faith. On the other hand, Investor’s decision not to 
provide the second tranche of funding presents a much more difficult 
issue of contract law. The relational nature of the contract may create 
a heightened duty of good faith, but it also may be the case that 
Investor was at liberty to simply walk away from the deal and not 
provide further funding, since the parties could have bargained for the 
full amount of funding up front and chose not to do so. 
3. Control 
From the perspective of a litigation investor, lack of control is 
not a risk per se. In fact, were the investor confident that the claim 
owner’s interests aligned with his own and that the owner’s abilities 
to pursue those interests were equal or superior to the investor’s, then 
it would be in the investor’s interest to shift as much control as 
possible to the owner and free ride off of the litigant’s efforts. But 
neither of these assumptions is necessarily true, which makes lack of 
investor control a serious risk in commercial litigation investment. 
Claim owners often have different interests than investors for 
many of the same reasons that plaintiffs often have different interests 
than their attorneys.49 Because an investor has diversified her 
 
 49. See Coffee, supra note 7, at 307–08 (describing consequences of divergent risk 
preferences of risk-averse class action–plaintiff’s counsel and relatively risk-neutral class 
members).  
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portfolio of cases, she may be less invested in the outcome of the case 
than the claim owner; similarly, because she is a repeat player, the 
lawyer may be more interested in settling any single individual case 
for less than its true value (or at least the value the owner prefers).50 
Like a contingent fee lawyer who has invested in her client’s case, 
there may come a point where the investor foresees no additional 
expected return for any additional investment and rationally would 
prefer settlement where the client (who is spending someone else’s 
money) would prefer to continue to litigate.51 A plaintiff may have 
other concerns in addition to the monetary recovery at issue in the 
litigation—she may be seeking to change the law or to obtain 
nonmonetary remedies, such as injunctive relief, which will have no 
value to the investor unless they are monetized through settlement 
and release (which may not be what the plaintiff wants).52 
Our hypothetical is structured around the incommensurable 
preferences of Owner and Investor, in an injunction and a monetary 
award, respectively. Their interests were thus misaligned at the 
outset. Investor’s president believed that Owner was exaggerating his 
preference for an injunction, while Owner meant what he said. These 
preferences collided when Partner offered a substantial monetary 
settlement but refused to agree to entry of an injunction. At this point, 
Owner and Investor were mutually vulnerable. Investor risked losing 
the $800,000 to which it was entitled (which it inflated into $1.2 
million by delaying decision on the settlement offer), and Owner 
 
 50. See, e.g., Herbert M. Kritzer, The Wages of Risk: The Returns of Contingency Fee Legal 
Practice, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 267, 297–98 (1998) (showing positive correlation between 
contingency lawyers’ median effective hourly rate and the lawyers’ annual volume of contingency 
cases). 
 51. See Clermont & Currivan, supra note 39, at 543–44 (describing client’s desire to 
maximize return without taking into account the value of time invested by the lawyer); Coffee, 
supra note 7, at 307 (explaining that the individual plaintiffs in a class action suit are more 
willing to risk trial than the attorneys, who often have more investment and potential return at 
stake). Of course, one major difference between the investor and the lawyer is that the lawyer’s 
continued participation and advice to the plaintiff is governed by the rules of professional 
responsibility, a constraint not present in litigation finance. 
 52. A parallel risk arises in liability insurance when the liability insurer demands, as a 
condition of accepting the duty to defend, control over settlement. Some insureds (especially 
physicians) have tried to sue their insurers for settling claims within policy limits without regard 
to some other interest the insured may have had. Sebok, supra note 5, at 30. No court has 
recognized such a claim. See, e.g., Hurvitz v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 135 Cal. Rptr. 2d 
703, 712 (Ct. App. 2003) (citing W. Polymer Tech., Inc. v. Reliance Ins. Co., 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d 78, 
85 (Ct. App. 1995)) (explaining that the law does not require the insurer to take into account the 
insured’s entire well-being, but only the judgment at risk in the claim against the insured); 
Shuster v. S. Broward Hosp. Dist. Physicians’ Prof’l Liab. Ins. Trust, 591 So. 2d 174, 176–77 (Fla. 
1992) (“The . . . insured was put on notice that the agreement granted the insurer the exclusive 
authority to control settlement and to be guided by its own self-interest when settling the claim 
for amounts within the policy limits.”). 
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risked losing the opportunity to obtain an injunction at trial, which, 
assuming Lawyer’s estimate was accurate, was a nonzero but still 
highly remote possibility. 
What norms should regulate the relationship between Owner 
and Investor at a point when their interests come into conflict? While 
one might simply say “good faith and fair dealing,” it makes a great 
deal of difference whether these duties arise as a matter of contract or 
tort law. Contract good faith means, essentially, fairness in 
performance of the parties’ bargain.53 If the agreement permitted 
Investor to discontinue funding the litigation, then Investor arguably 
did not act in bad faith by refusing to provide the second tranche. By 
contrast, tort bad faith is a vaguer, more open-ended standard that 
may permit Owner to recover from Investor in these circumstances. 
Separate from the question of divergent interests, the investor 
and plaintiff may have divergent views about the best way to achieve 
those interests. The disagreement could be honest and sincere, but it 
needs to be resolved nonetheless, since the plaintiff’s attorney needs to 
be instructed.54 Sometimes disputes over strategy and tactics may be 
pretexts for disputes over money, for example, where the plaintiff 
wants “belts and suspenders” litigation support or to file an expensive 
brief, and the investor worries this will lead to another request for 
funding. Other times, disputes may simply reflect genuine 
disagreements over substance. The client may prefer a novel theory of 
liability that the investor fears will alienate the court, or the investor 
may become disenchanted with the attorneys initially selected by the 
plaintiff and may seek to have them replaced or—if he is willing to 
spend the money—shadowed by a second firm that specializes in this 
area of law. The parties in our hypothetical had a relatively ill-defined 
set of communication obligations, based roughly on the lawyer-client 
duties of communication set out in ABA Model Rule of Professional 
Conduct 1.4, but did not include any practical mechanism for 
enforcing these duties. 
Regardless of the nature and source of the disagreement over 
control, these disagreements may ripen at any time during the 
 
 53. See infra Part III.B. 
 54. Our hypothetical is constructed with the assumption that it is not a true dual-client 
representation as occurs in many states pursuant to the representation of tort defendants under 
a liability insurance policy providing for the insurer to retain and compensate counsel for the 
defense of the insured. See supra note 9 for the extensive literature on the “triangular” attorney-
insurer-insured relationship. In the hypothetical, Owner is the only party giving instructions to 
Law Firm. Although Owner had previously made a contractual delegation of his right to make 
decisions regarding settlement, the contract did not require Owner to provide an instruction to 
Law Firm that it should look to Investor for the decision.  
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litigation. Disagreements over settlement, of course, can only arise 
after the case has progressed enough that settlement negotiations are 
underway. Disagreements over tactics can emerge very early on, from 
the selection of counsel, venue, or legal arguments to the day-to-day 
decisions about experts and discovery requests. An investor may wish 
to bargain for more extensive control or may be willing to trust the 
claim owner and its counsel. Any opportunity for control, however, 
brings with it the possibility that one party will believe control is 
being exercised in the interests of the other party. In the hypothetical, 
the settlement offer crystalized the divergent interests of the parties 
and turned a previously well-functioning relationship into a struggle 
for control over the disposition of the parties’ jointly owned asset. 
The risks that arise from suboptimal investor control may not 
be remediable. Every litigation-investment transaction begins with 
100% of legal control in the plaintiff’s hands. This is because, absent 
either a voluntary act of assignment or involuntary equitable 
subrogation, every legal claim, whether based on tort, contract, or 
property, belongs to the original party in interest. It is a matter of 
some controversy and some dispute whether and to what extent the 
party in interest in a suit may alienate incidents of control over their 
suit.55 
For purposes of this Article, we shall assume the most 
permissive view: free alienability of choses in action is the rule and 
can be limited only under special circumstances for reasons of public 
policy.56 This means that the framework assumed by this Article is 
one where parties are at liberty to alienate in full any chose in action 
for any reason and therefore are at liberty to alienate any lesser power 
(or combination of lesser powers) over that chose in action to a 
stranger.57 This assumption will allow us to see more clearly the 
 
 55. See Sebok, supra note 5, at 9–31 (stating that arguments against allowing alienation of 
some or all control over litigation by claim owners are not supported by common law principles). 
But see AM. BAR ASS’N COMM’N ON ETHICS 20/20, supra note 11, at 22–24 (discussing 
jurisdictions that condition legality of litigation finance on lack of control being secured by 
investor).  
 56. It may be the case, for example, that litigation investment should not be permitted in 
divorce cases where the interests of children may be affected by, for example, the direct or 
indirect control by an investor.  
 57. This means that the assignment and the sale of control cannot violate independent 
obligations in law, e.g., it cannot be for “improper” purposes. See DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF 
TORTS 1263–64 (2001) (discussing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 767 (1979) and listing the 
Restatement “factors” that determine whether interference is improper); Toste Farm Corp. v. 
Hadbury, Inc., 798 A.2d 901, 906 (R.I. 2002) (“To prevail on a claim alleging tortious interference 
with contract, a plaintiff must show ‘(1) the existence of a contract; (2) the alleged wrongdoer’s 
knowledge of the contract; (3) his [her, or its] intentional interference; and (4) damages resulting 
therefrom.’ ” (quoting UST Corp. v. Gen. Rd. Trucking Corp., 783 A.2d 931, 937 (R.I. 2001))).  
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effectiveness of any particular risk-mitigation strategy in relation to 
maximizing investor control, which is, from the investor’s point of 
view, probably a primary and unalloyed good. As we will detail below, 
we can only see clearly the benefits of risk mitigation as measured 
against a dimension such as control if we can weigh accurately the 
strategy’s desirability given its costs. 
4. Opportunities Foregone 
Some contracts are risky because, although both parties know 
what each hopes to gain in the exchange, one or both parties cannot 
trust the other to perform certain acts known to be essential ex ante. 
In litigation investment, these risks are captured mostly under the 
headings of information asymmetry and shirking. As the discussion of 
control indicated, there are a number of reasons why parties may not 
define explicitly which “control acts” are essential to performance ex 
ante: they may not know, or they may see the cost of defining (and 
negotiating) which terms are essential as so costly as to be not worth 
the effort.  
The risk underlying the loss of control is paradigmatic of 
relational contracts.58 The ideas of role integrity, reciprocity, and 
planning are central features of relational contracts.59 In relational 
commercial contracts, as in the case of the risk of loss of control, many 
terms are left unspecified. Sometimes this is because the relevant acts 
are unknown. But often, the relevant acts are known; in those 
circumstances—just like in the risk of loss of control—the cost of 
specifying when and at what price those acts must be secured may be 
sufficiently high to wreck the contract formation process if pursued ex 
ante.60 
For example, the owner of a claim must know (or at least can 
be assumed to know) that there is always a slight chance that the 
value of their claims is much more than they imagine. This could, they 
know, lead them to regret their original investment promise with the 
investor. Contract terms could be negotiated ex ante to deal with this 
problem, but doing so could undermine the good will and sense of 
cooperation necessary to form a contract at all. The cost of these 
negotiations may be high, and the possibility necessitating these costs 
might be very remote, so a rational party would leave the question of 
defection alone and “cross that bridge when they come to it.” 
 
 58. See supra note 9 (citing academic literature discussing relational contracts).  
 59. Feinman, supra note 22, at 555 (citing IAN R. MACNEIL & PAUL J. GUDEL, CONTRACTS: 
EXCHANGE TRANSACTIONS AND RELATIONS, at v (3d ed. 2001).  
 60. Id. at 556.  
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In our hypothetical, the risk of a foregone opportunity comes 
not so much at the risk that there will be a huge upside (and the 
regret that comes with it) but that, at the outset, there are interests 
that pose huge upfront negotiating costs in order to avoid a relatively 
remote possibility. Owner did tell Investor that he had at least two 
goals (money and professional independence from Partner), and 
Owner and Investor agreed on a price for shared control over the joint 
pursuit of these two ends. We have already observed how litigation-
investment contracts must explicitly accommodate the risk of loss of 
control. But the point we are making is now slightly different. 
One of two things may have happened in our hypothetical, both 
of them highlighting a risk slightly different than the practical 
problem of how Owner (or Investor) can get the degree of control 
optimal for their known preferences. First, Owner may have 
underestimated his relative preference for the injunction (and the 
professional independence it promised) when he negotiated the 
contract, and the risk of him doing that may have been something 
Investor reasonably anticipated or unreasonably discounted.61 Or, 
Owner may have estimated his relative preference for the injunction 
but rationally recognized that the cost of negotiating to preserve its 
possibility would have been very high, given that his true preferences 
may have seemed idiosyncratic to Investor, and that any time spent 
dwelling on this contract term would have colored the negotiations 
over all the other terms where Owner and Investor basically shared 
the same premises and values. It is not obviously irrational to tacitly 
agree not to plan for the possibility that the injunction would be 
waived in exchange for more money because the probability of 
securing the injunction was close to zero without the contract. 
Whatever the reason for failing to rationally plan for that 
possibility, once it ripens into a real option, the Investor and the 
Owner may disagree about whether the contract requires the Investor 
to credit the Owner’s newly revealed preference. Designing the 
contract to provide an exceptional resolution to the risk of foregone 
opportunities ex ante will enhance both the contract and the joint 
value of the litigation-funding enterprise. 
 
 61. The existence of cognitive errors and the variety of these biases that lead to the errors is 
known. See, e.g., Ward Farnsworth, The Legal Regulation of Self-Serving Bias, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. 567, 568 (2003) (defining self-serving bias as “the tendency to make various judgments in a 
manner skewed to favor one’s own self-interest”); Gillette, supra note 9, at 543–44 (describing 
contractual parties’ tendency to discount low-probability events when making decisions in 
conditions of uncertainty).  
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III. TOOLS FOR MITIGATING LITIGATION-INVESTMENT RISK 
A. Tort and Other Extracontractual Remedies 
1. Introduction 
At first glance, tort law is not a likely mechanism for 
controlling risk in litigation investment. The fact that the relationship 
between the investor and owner is contractual suggests that contract 
law should control risk. But to invoke the investment contract as a 
reason to allow contract law to exclusively define the rights, 
obligations, and remedies of the parties to the agreement is to beg the 
question, “When does tort law provide remedies for injuries arising 
between parties to a contract?”62 The history of private law is one of 
constant adjustment around what William Powers called the “border” 
between tort and contract.63 Even brief reflection over the curriculum 
of a first-year torts class reveals just how porous that border is: 
medical malpractice, which is generally a matter of contract law in 
civilian systems, is almost exclusively handled by tort in the common 
law, as are claims between purchasers and sellers of consumer 
products, despite the fact that sales contracts govern those 
transactions.64 
The “economic loss rule”65 denies recovery in negligence for “a 
financial loss that is not causally connected to personal injury or 
 
 62. See William Powers, Jr., Border Wars, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1209, 1215–16 (1994) 
(highlighting the implied duty of good faith as an area where tort and contract legal regimes 
collide). 
 63. Id. at 1209. 
 64. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Medical Malpractice: The Case for Contract, 1 AM. B. 
FOUND. RES. J. 87, 94 (1976) (“[Medical malpractice and product liability claims] are today 
regarded as species of tort law and they place too much pressure on a system of law that works 
best at keeping people apart, not bringing them together.”); Richard A. Epstein, Medical 
Malpractice, Imperfect Information, and the Contractual Foundation for Medical Services, 49 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 201, 201 (1986) (noting that tort law governs medical-malpractice 
claims); William L. Prosser, The Assault upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 
YALE L.J. 1099, 1102 (1960) (detailing the “assault” upon privity as it then stood in 1960 and the 
advent of “a general rule imposing negligence liability upon any supplier, for remuneration, of 
any chattel”); William L. Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 
MINN. L. REV. 791, 791 (1966) (hailing the “fall of the citadel of privity” of contract as a 
restriction on recovering for product-related injury); William L. Prosser, The Implied Warranty of 
Merchantable Quality, 27 MINN. L. REV. 117, 122–125 (1943) (discussing the expansion of 
liability in tort-based breaches of warranty in sales contracts). 
 65. See, e.g., Robert J. Rhee, A Production Theory of Pure Economic Loss, 104 NW. U. L. 
REV. 49, 49 (2010). 
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property damage suffered by the same plaintiff.”66 It is the default 
answer to the question of whether contract or tort should control in 
cases like the litigation investment described in Part II.67 The 
economic loss rule, however, is not a single rule, although it refers to 
the general observation that in the common law claims for pure 
economic loss in tort are disfavored.68 The range of exceptions to the 
economic loss rule is broad, so it does not easily fall into neat 
analytical categories.69 At its core, the economic loss rule bars recovery 
by “strangers—that is[,] . . . persons with whom the defendant has no 
relationship by contract, undertaking, or specific legal obligation.”70 
But even this relatively fixed rule has exceptions, namely so-called 
transferred loss cases involving, among other things, subrogation and 
duties to avoid causing economic loss that is “particularly 
foreseeable.”71 The rule becomes riddled with even more exceptions 
when applied to cases in which the defendant and plaintiff have some 
sort of relationship, legal or otherwise. After Hedley Byrne v. Heller, 
any pretext that the economic loss rule could be applied in a 
predictable fashion ex ante was abandoned.72 Skirmishes (what 
Powers called “border wars”) abounded,73 perhaps the most significant 
 
 66. Bruce Feldthusen, What the United States Taught the Commonwealth About Pure 
Economic Loss: Time to Repay the Favor, 38 PEPP. L. REV. 309, 311 (2011) (citing Rhee, supra 
note 65, at 49). 
 67. See DAVID W. ROBERTSON ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 251 (4th ed. 2011) 
(“Traditional Anglo–American tort law denied recovery in negligence for [pure economic] losses, 
and there is still a pronounced reluctance to redress them.”). For an argument on the relative 
indeterminacy of the economic loss rule, see Gregory S. Crespi, Good Faith and Bad Faith in 
Contract Law: Reflections on A Cautionary Tale and Border Wars, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1277, 1289 
(1994). 
 68. Dan B. Dobbs, An Introduction to Non-Statutory Economic Loss Claims, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 
713, 713 (2006) (“The stand-alone or ‘pure’ economic loss covered by the economic loss rules 
refers to pecuniary or commercial loss that does not arise from actionable physical, emotional or 
reputational injury to persons or physical injury to property.”). 
 69. See, e.g., Anita Bernstein, Keep It Simple: An Explanation of the Rule of No Recovery for 
Pure Economic Loss, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 773, 782–83 (2006) (listing various scholarly attempts to 
categorize economic loss torts). 
 70. Dobbs, supra note 68, at 715.  
 71. Peter Benson, The Problem with Pure Economic Loss, 60 S.C. L. REV. 823, 850–52 
(2009); see Anthony J. Sebok, The Failed Promise of a General Theory of Pure Economic Loss: An 
Accident of History?, 61 DEPAUL L. REV. 615, 621 (2012) (observing California’s willingness to 
find tort liability for economic loss when defendants could foresee the likelihood of economic 
harm to known third parties). 
 72. [1964] A.C. 465 (H.L.) (U.K.). See Feldthusen, supra note 66, at 317 (“[After Hedley 
Byrne,] Commonwealth lawyers and judges abandoned the exclusionary rule or replaced it with 
unpredictable, unprincipled ad hoc decisions.”). 
 73. Powers, supra note 62, at 1209. 
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over pure economic loss that defective products caused to customers.74 
To say that the rule is clear and that contract and tort are 
dichotomous ignores the reality of the situation.75 Members of the 
American Law Institute so resisted an effort to make the economic 
loss rule black letter law by entrenching it in the Restatement (Third) 
of Torts that the Reporter advocating exactly this position resigned in 
frustration.76 We can see why some American lawyers would find it 
reasonable to treat litigation-investment contracts under negligence 
law. After all, the courts have substantial experience with negligent-
performance or negligent-service cases, a category of transactions 
where the plaintiff suffers pure economic loss due to the negligence of 
its counterparty.77 
Traditionally, the economic loss rule has not been applied to 
pure services transactions.78 Even after the recent return of the 
economic loss rule in products liability, a case could be made that the 
rule should not apply to contracts for services, despite its application 
to sales contracts.79 But even if this presumption were correct, it 
would not, as an initial matter, tell courts how to handle cases where 
the service provider expressly limits liability for defective services.80 
We know that, in some cases, not only does the economic loss rule not 
apply to certain service contracts, but in a subset of those contracts, 
the law does not allow promisees to waive through explicit waiver the 
 
 74. See Gary T. Schwartz, Economic Loss in American Tort Law: The Examples of J’Aire 
and of Products Liability, 23 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 37, 70–77 (1986) (discussing Seely v. White 
Motor Co., 403 P.2d 145, 147 (1965)); see also Sarah Borstel Porter, Economic Loss in Product 
Liability: Strict Liability or Uniform Commercial Code? Spring Motors Distributing, Inc. v. Ford 
Motor Co., 28 B.C. L. REV. 383, 390–91 (1987) (explaining the important distinction drawn by the 
California Supreme Court in Seely between recovery for personal injury and economic loss). 
 75. Schwartz, supra note 74, at 49. 
 76. See Feldthusen, supra note 66, at 320 (noting that the ALI membership continues to 
insist that “the law of economic negligence should be situated within a general tort of negligence” 
(quoting letter from Mark Gergen)). 
 77. See id. at 309 n.3 (noting that American courts recognize economic loss claims stemming 
from negligent performance of professional services). 
 78. JULIAN B. MCDONNELL & ELIZABETH J. COLEMAN, COMMERCIAL AND CONSUMER 
WARRANTIES 1–47 (Matthew Bender, rev. ed.) (citing Cargill, Inc. v. Boag Cold Storage 
Warehouse, Inc., 71 F.3d 545, 550–52 (6th Cir. 1995); Bailey Farms, Inc. v. NOR-AM Chem. Co., 
27 F.3d 188, 191–93 (6th Cir. 1994); In re Merritt Logan, Inc., 901 F.2d 349, 360–64 (3d Cir. 
1990); Dairyland Ins. Co. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 549 So. 2d 44, 45–47 (Ala. 1989); N. Am. Chem. 
Co. v. Superior Court, 69 Cal. Rptr. 2d 466, 471–80 (Ct. App. 1997); Cooley v. Big Horn 
Harvestore Sys., 767 P.2d 740 (Colo. App. 1988); Duffin v. Idaho Crop Improvement Ass’n, 895 
P.2d 1195, 1199–1202 (Idaho 1995); McCarthy Well Co. v. St. Peter Creamery, Inc., 410 N.W.2d 
312, 315–17 (Minn. 1987)). 
 79. Dobbs, supra note 68, at 723–27. 
 80. Id. at 727. 
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tort duties owed to them.81 This is evidence of a very strong rejection 
of the economic loss rule in at least a subset of cases involving 
contracts. 
The foregoing discussion about the courts’ rejection of the 
economic loss rule in service contracts tells us something simple and 
important. Notwithstanding frequent reliance upon something called 
“the economic loss rule,” it is nothing more than a rule of thumb. 
Further, its many gaps and exceptions teach an important lesson 
about how tort law protects pure economic interests. There is no way 
to deduce whether tort duties arise from litigation-investment 
contracts by asking, as an abstract matter, whether they are more like 
a service contract or a sales contract. It seems that even this level of 
reasoning by analogy may still be too crude and indeterminate. Our 
proposal is to approach the question much in the spirit of Rawlsian 
“reflective equilibrium,” that is, to use as our starting point a concrete 
doctrinal practice that seems close in structure and purpose to the 
contract in question. We can then test whether the reasons for 
treating it under the rubric of tort law fits our intuitions about 
whether the right balance is struck between the competing ends we 
hope to serve—protecting the investor from owner-imposed risks and 
protecting the owner from investor-imposed risks.82 
2. Freestanding Tort Liability for Bad Faith 
a. Bad Faith in the Noninsurance Context 
In fact, the best place to start our inquiry is an examination of 
why a litigation-investment contract is not a service contract at all. 
The investor is not providing a service to the owner in any 
 
 81. Id. Dobbs used the example of service contracts to provide legal representation.  
 82. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 48–51 (1971). The method of reflective 
equilibrium in ethics begins with considered judgments about what principles ought to regulate 
action. The agent then seeks to systematize those judgments with reference to more abstract 
theoretical principles. “[W]e may want to change our present considered judgments once their 
regulative principles are brought to light.” Id. at 49. A relatively limited scope of theoretical 
perspectives may be tested by the method of reflective equilibrium because, out of the whole 
range of positions for which there is a conceivable philosophical argument, only a limited number 
of theories will be familiar enough for consideration by an agent with bounded rationality. Rawls 
does not use the term bounded rationality but emphasizes that moral concepts and the a priori 
are too slender a basis for a theory of justice; rather, the starting point is the “moral sentiments” 
of people deliberating about justice. See id. at 51. Our methodology similarly begins with 
considered judgments about the way cases ought to be decided, with reference to familiar 
doctrinal categories such as contract, tort, and insurance law. The analysis does not begin with 
highly abstract principles, but more general theoretical considerations are used to regulate and 
systematize intuitive judgments.  
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conventional sense of the term. The chief purpose of the contract is to 
provide financial resources to the owner so that he can purchase legal 
resources to pursue the claim. A secondary purpose, as noted above, 
might be to monetize the claim so that the owner can sell the expected 
value of his claim if, as is often the case, the present value of the 
contingent claim is greater to him than its future value at judgment.83 
As explained in Part II, there may be many covenants and other 
features of the contract that produce consequences similar to those 
that the investor would produce if she held herself out as an advisor or 
“litigation coach,” but those are potential secondary effects of the 
contract’s primary goal, which is to maximize the mutually owned 
asset—the claim. 
If the foregoing is correct, then it seems that the advocate for 
analogizing the litigation-investment contract to a service contract has 
a heavy burden of proof. But before we even begin to examine whether 
the burden can be met by invoking some set of other unnamed 
countervailing factors, it must be noted that, as the Dobbs quote above 
illustrated, the economic loss rule falls less heavily on certain service 
contracts than others.84 Lawyers stand in a position of trust with their 
clients that goes beyond mere reliance that the “service provider” will 
do what she has promised to the best of her ability. Professionals 
exercise judgment in circumstances where the client lacks not only 
technical expertise but also the capacity to weigh competing 
alternatives to determine what is in its best interest. In this sense, the 
obligations of lawyers or physicians are more like those of fiduciaries 
since they are supposed to put the client’s relevant interest (in legal 
success or health) above their own if there ever is a conflict between 
the two. Further, most professionals who are subject to tort duties 
that cannot be waived are themselves obliged to conform their conduct 
to an independent code of professional responsibility. These codes 
consists of more than norms of conduct; they include professional 
institutions that can articulate professional norms, apply those norms 
 
 83. See Michael Abramowicz, On the Alienability of Legal Claims, 114 YALE L.J. 697, 737 
(2004) (“The price at which a claim is sold . . . will reflect an expected value of the 
judgment . . . .”); Isaac M. Marcushamer, Selling Your Torts: Creating a Market for Tort Claims 
and Liability, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1543, 1573–74 (2005) (analyzing the incentive structure of 
microeconomic markets for tort claims). 
 84. Dobbs, supra note 68, at 727 (“[B]ases for subjecting lawyers and perhaps some other 
professionals to negligence liability do indeed exist. When you retain someone for the express 
purpose of being on your side, he cannot rightly contract to be your adversary instead or to be on 
your side but free to be negligent.”). 
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outside of courts, and impose sanctions that are not penal but can still 
result in serious hardship.85 None of this is true of litigation funding. 
If we turn to tort claims arising from pure economic losses 
between parties who have nonservice contracts, the landscape 
becomes sparse indeed. The tort of bad faith breach of contract is a 
tale of an extraordinary rise and fall.86 The tort of bad faith rose to 
prominence in the insurance context.87 But after a brief period of 
intense academic excitement, the tort fell dramatically in almost every 
other context.88 
The Seaman’s case89 involved a maritime oil retailer that 
leased business space from the city of Eureka, California in a recently 
redeveloped waterfront area. Seaman’s success depended largely on 
obtaining a long-term supply contract with a major oil company so 
that it could sell diesel fuel to ships coming into Eureka. Seaman’s 
entered into a contract with Standard Oil of California, terminated 
negotiations with the other oil companies, and modified its lease to 
increase its space. Then, because of unforeseen external political 
 
 85. The norms of a profession may be contested by other legal institutions, and the 
resulting tug-of-war may result in an unstable balance of power between actors who compete to 
define the norms of a profession. See Susan P. Koniak, The Law Between the Bar and the State, 
70 N.C. L. REV. 1389, 1401 (1992) (detailing “a far more active competition between state and 
group norms” than traditionally suggested). The tort obligations of accountants and other 
professionals are not as well developed and robust as those of lawyers, and it is harder to say 
that the economic loss rule does not apply at all, since these professionals can limit liability by 
waiver in ways that lawyers cannot. See Gary T. Schwartz, American Tort Law and the 
(Supposed) Economic Loss Rule, in PURE ECONOMIC LOSS IN EUROPE 94, 96 (Mauro Bussani & 
Vernon Valentine Palmer eds., 2003); see also Bernstein, supra note 69, at 787 (listing 
professionals in addition to lawyers liable in tort for “flawed services”: accountants, architects, 
drug-testing laboratories, notary publics, and adoption agencies). 
 86. Since the 1970s “the law has witnessed the birth, growth, and death of the ‘bad faith’ 
tort—the cause of action for tortious breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing implied 
in every contract.” Kerry L. Macintosh, Gilmore Spoke Too Soon: Contract Rises from the Ashes of 
the Bad Faith Tort, 27 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 483, 484 (1994) (emphasis omitted). 
 87. See, e.g., Henderson, supra note 22, at 1 (“The opportunity to witness the appearance of 
a wholly new tort in the legal universe is rare indeed.”); Stephan Landsman, Juries as 
Regulators of Last Resort, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. (forthcoming 2014) (describing the reasons for 
the rise and institutional acceptance of the tort of bad faith in third- and first-party insurance 
coverage).  
 88. See Kyle Graham, Why Torts Die, 35 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 359, 368 (2008):  
A tort does not have to be old to die. A tort claim for bad faith denial of the existence 
of a contract was first recognized . . . by the California Supreme Court [and] that same 
court repudiated the bad faith denial of contract tort just eleven years later. 
See also Curtis Bridgeman, Note, Corrective Justice in Contract Law: Is There a Case for Punitive 
Damages?, 56 VAND. L. REV. 237, 269 (2003) (“The bad-faith tort arose in the 1950s 
[and] . . . reached its apex in Montana with a few cases that allowed such causes of action even 
absent a special relationship . . . [but by the 1990s] states once again restricted the tort to 
insurance cases.”).  
 89. Seaman’s Direct Buying Serv., Inc. v. Standard Oil Co., 686 P.2d 1158 (Cal. 1984). 
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events, the federal government threatened to restrict Standard Oil’s 
access to foreign oil unless it and Seaman’s participated in a complex 
and expensive series of hearings. Because Seaman’s would be 
financially unable to continue operations throughout a lengthy trial, it 
asked Standard to stipulate to the validity of their contract and told 
Standard of its financial plight. In reply, Standard’s representative 
laughed and said, “See you in court.”90 Seaman’s went out of business 
and thereafter brought an action against Standard Oil claiming, 
among other allegations, that Standard’s refusal to honor the contract 
was a tortious breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing arising from a contract that caused Seaman’s significant 
consequential damages. 
The California Supreme Court viewed Seaman’s position as 
analogous to that of an insured and cited a plethora of bad faith cases, 
including Comunale v. Traders & General Insurance Co.,91 Crisci v. 
Security Insurance Co., 92 and Gruenberg v. Aetna Insurance Co.93 The 
court drew the parallel at a relatively high level of abstraction, simply 
noting that the common law imposed a duty of good faith and fair 
dealing on all contracts.94 It recognized that allowing a tort remedy for 
the breach of that duty, as it had in the insurance cases, took the law 
into “largely uncharted and potentially dangerous waters.”95 The 
voyage into those waters was stormy indeed and caused, in the words 
of the California Supreme Court, “much confusion and 
conflict . . . regarding the scope and application of our Seaman’s 
holding.”96 Eleven years after it first expanded the bad faith tort, the 
Court decided to limit it to insurance contracts.97 
In Texas, a similar effort to expand bad faith beyond insurance 
was also attempted, as Mark Gergen has documented.98 Like 
California, Texas had an early experience with the application of bad 
faith in a noninsurance context that might, had it been allowed to 
grow, have blossomed into a general tort claim for bad faith.99 Manges 
v. Guerra involved a contract between two investors in mineral rights. 
 
 90. Id. at 1162. 
 91. 328 P.2d 198, 201 (Cal. 1958). 
 92. 426 P.2d 173, 176–77 (Cal. 1967). 
 93. 510 P.2d 1032, 1037 (Cal. 1973). 
 94. Seaman’s, 686 P.2d at 1166. 
 95. Id. at 1166–67. 
 96. Freeman & Mills, Inc. v. Belcher Oil Co., 900 P.2d 669, 676 (Cal. 1995). 
 97. Id. 
 98. Mark Gergen, A Cautionary Tale About Good Faith in Texas, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1235, 1235 
(1994). 
 99. Manges v. Guerra, 673 S.W.2d 180, 181–83 (Tex. 1984). 
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The majority owner took advantage of the executive powers granted 
under the contract to enrich himself and third parties at the expense 
of the minority owner.100 The Texas Supreme Court allowed the 
injured counterparty to sue for actual and exemplary damages, citing 
the duty of good faith as the ground for the claim.101 Gergen observed 
that despite some victories in the lower courts, Texas never extended 
Manges beyond insurance.102 In the employment context, the effort to 
allow employees to sue in tort for bad faith dismissals suffered a 
serious setback when the California Supreme Court repudiated 
Seaman’s.103 A very small number of states have recognized the right 
of employees to seek tort damages in cases where an employer has 
violated the implied covenant of good faith in the employment 
contract.104 The effort in the area of lender liability to establish a 
freestanding bad faith tort has also not fulfilled its initial promise.105 
California reversed an early decision recognizing the duty,106 and, 
despite cases such as K.M.C. Co. v. Irving Trust Co.107 and First 
National Bank v. Twombly,108 violations of the covenant of good faith 
 
 100. Id. at 183. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Gergen, supra note 98, at 1244. Gergen observed one exception, Schmueser v. 
Burkburnett Bank, which involved a service contract and was a “radical” outlier. See 937 F.2d 
1025 (5th Cir. 1991). 
 103. See Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373, 395 (1988) (declining to analogize the 
relationship between insurer and insured with the “usual” employment relationship). 
 104. See Firestone v. Oasis Telecomms., Data, & Records, Inc., No. DV 00-328, 2003 WL 
25960324 (Mont. Dist. Ct. Nov. 19, 2003) (concluding that a special relationship could have 
existed that would give rise to a bad faith–dismissal claim); State v. Sutton, 103 P.3d 8, 19 (Nev. 
2004) (traditional tort damages such as “injury to the feelings from humiliation, indignity and 
disgrace to the person” may be awarded); K Mart Corp. v. Ponsock, 732 P.2d 1364, 1369–70 (Nev. 
1987) (recognizing a bad faith–dismissal tort for specific instances). 
 105. See K.M.C. Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 757 F.2d 752, 760 (6th Cir. 1985) (recognizing 
tortious breach of the implied obligation of good faith and fair dealing in banking contracts); 
Werner Ebke & James Griffin, Good Faith and Fair Dealing in Commercial Lending 
Transactions: From Covenant to Duty and Beyond, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 1237, 1246 (1989) (“[M]ost 
courts have refused to find a special relationship between a lender and its borrower sufficient to 
support recovery for a tortious breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing.”). K.M.C. is 
discussed further in Part III.B. See infra notes 164–65 and accompanying text. 
 106. Commercial Cotton Co. v. United Cal. Bank, 163 Cal. Rptr. 551 (Ct. App. 1985), 
overruled by Copesky v. Superior Court, 229 Cal. Rptr. 338 (Ct. App. 1991). 
 107. 757 F.2d 752 (6th Cir. 1985). 
 108. First Nat’l Bank v. Twombly, 689 P.2d 1226, 1230 (Mont. 1984); see also Luxonomy 
Cars, Inc. v. Citibank, N.A., 408 N.Y.S.2d 951, 954 (App. Div. 1978) (“[A] tort may accompany a 
breach of contract, but only where the contract creates a relation out of which springs a duty, 
independent of the contract obligation, and that independent duty is also violated.”); State Nat’l 
Bank of El Paso v. Farah Mfg. Co., 678 S.W.2d 661, 683 (Tex. App. 1984) (analyzing a violation of 
the covenant of good faith and fair dealing under the duress framework). 
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and fair dealing are now mostly viewed as a matter of contract law.109 
It is hard to say why courts have not expanded the tort of bad 
faith. At first glance, it would appear as if wholly suspending the 
economic loss rule makes sense from the perspective of efficiency, 
although the debate over the threat of damages awards beyond what 
conventional contract principles would justify has raged for years and 
would take us beyond the scope of this Article.110 Powers’s 
explanation, which he called a “purposive or structuralist approach,” 
has some appeal, but we are not sure about the level of abstraction at 
which he chose to locate or discover deep-seated structures or 
purposes in the common law.111 Powers claims that the basic purpose 
of contract law is to instantiate “the ideology of autonomy and consent 
and [to] assign[] decision-making power to markets.”112 While we are 
sympathetic to this claim (on a descriptive, if not normative, level), we 
object to the next step in his argument, which is to suggest that tort 
law can therefore be best understood as a “gap filler” that “waits in the 
background to step in and resolve the disputes that occur when no 
contractual relationship is present.”113 We think that this is not only a 
strange way of defining legal concepts that have been more or less 
coequal in the history of the common law but also, for our purpose,  is 
not very enlightening. The question raised by the sporadic application 
of the economic loss rule is, to put it in Powers’s words, when is there 
“no contractual relationship . . . present”114 despite the presence of a 
contract? We know there must sometimes be no such relationship, 
because there is, at least in the area of insurance law, a tort of bad 
faith. 
Powers, to be fair, had an answer for these cases as well (which 
makes sense, as he developed this theory in the context of an article 
about the tort of bad faith breach of contract). His solution goes 
something like this: when contract law “step[s] out of the way by its 
 
 109. “The trend in the case law, however, is against imposing tort liability for a lender’s 
breach of the implied covenant of good faith.” Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing, 
in 4 BUSINESS TORTS § 37.04 (David G. Heiman ed., rev. ed. 2013); see also Gergen, supra note 
98, at n.100 (collecting cases). 
 110. See generally Alan Schwartz, The Myth that Promisees Prefer Supracompensatory 
Remedies: An Analysis of Contracting for Damage Measures, 100 YALE L.J. 369, 371 (1990) 
(arguing that punitive damages should not be used as a response to inefficiencies that follow 
underenforcement of the law); Steve Thel & Peter Siegelman, You Do Have to Keep Your 
Promises: A Disgorgement Theory of Contract Remedies, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1181, 1183 
(2011) (characterizing contract law in terms of “promisor expectation” remedies). 
 111. Powers, supra note 62, at 1224. 
 112. See id. (“Contract law, along with its accompanying prime directive of agreement and 
consent, sets its own limits.”). 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
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own terms,” tort law (or some other area of law) “might step in.”115 
Powers’s example of contract law “stepping out” comes exclusively 
from insurance bad faith.116 Insurance contracts are governed by tort 
when the insurer has a “conflict of interest.”117 An insurer who can 
expose an insured to risk in order to preserve the possibility of a better 
result for itself at trial (as in the classic third-party bad faith case) 
cannot be constrained by contract law, so contract law needs to call in 
support from the outside.118 
Powers’s abstract rhetoric is attractive. Contract and tort 
should be complementary, and we think that the analysis should ask 
the same question that Powers asks: what can contract do that tort 
cannot, and vice versa? The specifics of his argument have a question-
begging quality, however. First, the doctrinal line drawn by Texas 
courts, which Powers endorses, seems to exclude cases where a 
contracting party exercises executor power over resources jointly 
owned with a counterparty—which can exist in many contexts other 
than first-party insurance, as the Manges case demonstrates. Second, 
the rationale Powers offers to explain why the conflict of interest that 
an insurer faces in a third-party liability case is different from the 
pursuit of self-interest in first-party contract disputes just restates his 
conclusion. He simply says that “the insurer is a fiduciary with an 
obligation to defend the insured according to the insured’s best 
interests.”119 An insurer is not technically a fiduciary, although some 
courts have held that, with regard to the duty to settle and duty to 
defend, the insurer’s duty is like that of a fiduciary.120 
Some insurance-law scholars have no patience for those who 
conflate “fiduciary-like duties” for purposes of ascertaining whether 
 
 115. Id. at 1229:  
[C]ontract law itself should tell us which body of law should control. If contract law 
purports to decide the case, the negligence paradigm (and its cousin, good faith) 
should stay in the background. Again, this does not mean that contract law will 
always trump tort law; instead, it means that contract law, not tort law, should tell us 
which paradigm should control. 
 116. Id. at 1230. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. at 1229. 
 120. See Van Noy v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 16 P.3d 574, 581 n.4 (Wash. 2001) 
(Talmadge, J., concurring) (quoting Douglas R. Richmond, Trust Me: Insurers Are Not 
Fiduciaries to Their Insureds, 88 KY. L.J. 1, 2 (2000)): 
The duty of a fiduciary to his beneficiary is essentially that of a trustee. A fiduciary ‘is 
bound to act in the highest good faith toward his beneficiary’ and he may never seek 
to gain an advantage over his beneficiary by any means. A fiduciary must give priority 
to his beneficiary’s best interest whenever he acts on the beneficiary’s behalf. A 
fiduciary owes his beneficiary a duty of undivided loyalty, meaning that a fiduciary 
cannot abandon or stray from this relationship to further his own interests. 
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tort or contract applies with the proposition that insurers are 
fiduciaries.121 We agree. If the courts are going to fill in gaps left by 
contract with “fiduciary-like” tort duties, they need a better reason 
than saying, in effect, that contract law cannot protect counterparties 
to whom “fiduciary-like” duties are owed. That argument is circular. 
b. Bad Faith in the Insurance Context 
i. Third-Party Insurance Bad Faith 
So what is it about the insurance contract that has led to such 
a rapid and complete consensus that it needs to be complemented by 
tort duties?122 The third-party cases, which were the vanguard for the 
tort of bad faith, are easy to understand in terms of the risks described 
in Part II. 
In the Crisci v. Security Insurance Co. case, for example, the 
insured was subject to the risks of shirking and loss of control.123 The 
company defended its insured but declined an offer to settle for 
$10,000 (the policy limit) in a case in which its claims manager and 
attorney both thought there was a significant likelihood of a much 
larger judgment. The company appeared to decide that, since its own 
risk was capped at $10,000, it might as well take a shot at convincing 
a jury that a smaller verdict (or none at all) was warranted. Even 
when the plaintiffs dropped their demand to $9000 and Crisci offered 
to pay $2500 of that amount, the insurer refused to offer more than 
$3000 (the out-of-pocket medical expenses of one of the plaintiffs). At 
trial, the jury awarded $101,000. This award ruined the insured, a 
seventy-year-old immigrant widow.124 She filed a bad faith action 
against her insurer claiming economic damages and mental 
 
 121. See, e.g., Silver & Syverud, supra note 6, at 285–86 (“The hallmarks of agency—
fiduciary duty and control—are missing from the relationship between the company and the 
insured.”). 
 122. This conclusion is not universally shared, although it is a dominant view in both the 
courts and in the academy. Robert Jerry has argued that contract law could have provided 
insureds with the same level (or at least an adequate level) of protection as the bad faith tort. See 
Robert H. Jerry, II, The Wrong Side of the Mountain: A Comment on Bad Faith’s Unnatural 
History, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1317, 1342 (1993). 
 123. See Crisci v. Sec. Ins. Co., 426 P.2d 173, 173–76 (Cal. 1967) (explaining that defendant’s 
insurance company declined to settle when it believed a jury verdict would award damages of 
less than $100,000 even when specifically authorized to settle by defendant.). 
 124. Id. at 175–76. In the ensuing settlement, Mrs. Crisci lost the rental property that was 
her sole source of income as well as everything else of value that she owned. Id. According to the 
Court, her health declined, she suffered mental illness, and she attempted suicide. Id. 
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distress.125 The trial court awarded Crisci full damages, including 
$25,000 for pain and suffering. The California Supreme Court upheld 
the award, saying that the insured had a right to rely on the company 
not to “gamble with the insured’s money to further its own 
interests.”126 
The language of Crisci emphasized both the noncommercial 
motive behind Crisci’s purchase of insurance127 and her trust in the 
insurer to take her interests into account and to act “reasonably” when 
handling her settlement negotiations.128 It also emphasized the 
inexorable economic incentives written into the contract itself. It was 
obvious (although perhaps not to Crisci) that the contract created, in 
many circumstances, a conflict of interest between the insurer and the 
insured. Therefore, Crisci faced both shirking risks and control risks. 
The inexorable conflict identified by the court—that in some 
circumstances going to trial rather than settling the case will be to the 
advantage of the insurer—is a classic example of the negative 
consequences flowing from one party putting the other party’s money 
at risk. This is shirking in the sense that, by purchasing a low 
probability of saving between $0 and $10,000, the insurer forced Crisci 
to “pay for” a much larger risk that she would have to pay a large 
amount of money (which turned out to be $100,000). This is no 
different from one party to a contract taking more than his fair share 
of the profits of a joint undertaking or, in the case of litigation 
investment, the claim owner not investing any time or energy into the 
litigation after the investor has delivered the funds. 
Whether the shirking risks alone are enough to justify 
suspending the economic loss rule in first-party insurance cases is not 
something we can easily answer, but we do not need to, since it is 
obvious that, in the eyes of most observers (including, for example, 
Powers), the risk that the insurer will exercise control over the 
insured’s litigation in ways that ignores the insured’s preferences and 
desires seems to push the case over the boundary line. By control, we 
do not mean only that the insured harmed Crisci’s economic interests 
through its unilateral control, since that seems to simply restate the 
 
 125. In fact, Crisci assigned her bad faith claim to the plaintiffs as part of her settlement, a 
point irrelevant to this discussion. See id. 
 126. Id. at 177. 
 127. Id. at 179 (“Among the considerations in purchasing liability insurance, as insurers are 
well aware, is the peace of mind and security . . . .”). 
 128. Id. at 176 (Insurer was expected to “give the interests of the insured at least as much 
consideration as it gives to its own interests; and that when ‘there is great risk of a recovery 
beyond the policy limits’ ” to exercise reasonable judgment on behalf of the insured. (quoting 
Comunale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 328 P.2d 198, 201 (Cal. 1968))). 
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shirking risk again; rather, we mean something more specific. The 
insurer literally ignored Crisci’s agency in the litigation; it ignored her 
preferences about settlement strategy, and it even went so far as to 
ignore her offer to participate in the settlement by contributing $2500. 
Thus, if Crisci believed—as some laypeople do—that third-party 
liability insurance would provide sufficient resources to effectively 
litigate, her expectations of securing partial control over her litigation 
through the insurance contract were disappointed.129 
This analysis suggests a limited role for tort bad faith 
principles in commercial litigation-investment contracts where one 
party utterly ignores the expressed preferences of another. The 
situation in our hypothetical is different, however, because the claim 
owner’s preferences were part of the negotiations over the investment 
contract. Owner could have bargained for the right to make settlement 
decisions without obtaining Investor’s approval, but that was not the 
agreement the parties reached. Perhaps Owner received terms that 
were more favorable in other respects, such as the return to which 
Investor would be entitled at various points in time. Nevertheless, the 
distinction remains that the parties in the hypothetical bargained over 
their outcome-related preferences, unlike the parties in Crisci. 
The above analysis, which emphasizes the lay consumer’s 
perspective, may seem relevant only to consumer litigation 
investment, a field that, as noted above, this paper avoids.130 A large 
 
 129. It is a separate question whether the California Supreme Court should have read into 
the liability insurance contract any form of shared control. Most liability contracts can be read to 
transfer all control over litigation to the insurer unless there is a special “consent to settle” 
clause. See Sebok, supra note 5, at 28–30 (“[T]he standard liability contract does not require an 
insurer to take into account the insured’s litigation preferences . . . .”). Laypeople may resent 
when their insurance company settles what they believe are frivolous claims instead of resisting 
them. See James Fischer, Insurer-Policyholder Interests, Defense Counsel’s Professional Duties, 
and the Allocation of Power to Control the Defense, 14 CONN. INS. L.J. 21, 40 (2007): 
The policyholder wishes to contest liability, perhaps to avoid the stigma of 
responsibility or the economic consequences of a finding of fault. A defense limited to 
the issue of damages may be perceived by the policyholder as an acknowledgment of 
legal responsibility. For some individuals such an admission may be difficult to make 
even in the face of clear evidence of fault. Some individuals can live with the vagaries 
of life. They will accept the decision to focus the litigation on minimizing the loss even 
though it means admitting, or being understood as admitting, responsibility for 
conduct they do not actually believe was legally wrongful. Other individuals will find 
such conduct morally and emotionally repugnant. 
 130. Given the structure of consumer litigation-investment contracts today, the risks posed 
by those contracts are both fewer and somewhat one-sided. The main risks of consumer 
litigation-investment contracts imposed by the owner upon the investor are: information 
asymmetry (the claimholder may lie about the facts underlying their claim) and shirking (the 
claimholder may “take the money and run” either before or after conclusion of the case). The 
investor cannot impose symmetrical risks on the owner because consumer litigation investment 
is not staged and never transfers any control over to the investor.  
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proportion of the bad faith cases discussed in the literature involve 
individuals who are consumers, which has led some observers to limit 
their discussion of the law of bad faith to the perspective and needs of 
individual consumers.131 Nonetheless, the law of bad faith protects 
businesses as well as individuals, and courts do not apply the law 
differently based either on the insured’s legal status, level of 
sophistication, or level of perceived economic dependency.132 Courts 
have adopted the correct approach to shirking; the conflict of interest 
that presented itself in the Crisci case is the same regardless of 
whether the insured was a seventy-year-old woman, a school district, 
or a large multinational corporation.133 It is an open question whether 
the risk of loss of control would generate the same degree of pressure 
to push across the border from contract to tort where the insured is a 
corporation or a sophisticated, high–net worth individual. To our 
knowledge, no court has said as much. We think that courts should be 
more willing to turn in cases in loss of control cases involving 
consumers. In commercial litigation investment, the claim owners are 
either corporations or sophisticated, high–net worth individuals. We 
think that the courts would be right in these cases to be skeptical of 
claims by plaintiffs that they could not bargain ex ante for the degree 
of control they optimally would have wished to retain.134 
ii. First-Party Insurance Bad Faith 
There are important differences between third- and first-party 
bad faith breach in insurance law that explain why the breach of a 
litigation-investment contract should be remedied under contract law, 
not tort. One important difference concerns the insurer’s promise to 
the insured. All so-called third-party bad faith cases involve the 
 
 131. See, e.g., Feinman, supra note 22, at 556 (“The relationship between an insurance 
company and its consumer policyholder is perhaps the best example of a relational contract of 
dependence and inequality.”). Feinman acknowledges that the law of bad faith in insurance 
applies in commercial-insurance contexts as well, but chooses to describe the insurance contract 
entirely from the perspective of a consumer who lacks both power and sophistication. Id. at 556 
n.14. 
 132. See, e.g., Transp. Ins. Co. v. Post Express Co., 138 F.3d 1189, 1192 (7th Cir. 1998) 
(holding that duty by a business, as an insured, to settle was violated in bad faith because 
“[e]vidence in this case permitted a rational jury to conclude that Transport Insurance gambled 
with its client’s money”). 
 133. See 1-2 NEW APPLEMAN INSURANCE BAD FAITH LITIGATION § 2.03[1] (“Insurer Must 
Consider Insured’s Interests”) (discussing Transp. Ins. Co. v. Post Express Co.). 
 134. In liability insurance, for example, sophisticated counterparties have been able to 
contract for control, and courts have refused to extend bad faith–tort principles to cases where 
plaintiffs have alleged that the exercise of the control ceded to the insurer-caused injury. See 
Silver & Syverud, supra note 6, at 264–65 (reviewing “full coverage” cases). 
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breach of a promise to assist the insured if they are sued by a third 
party.135 This contrasts with first-party cases in which the insurer 
promises to cover losses suffered by the insured for any reason 
specified in the contract, such as fire or accident. While both forms of 
insurance predated its rise, the bad faith tort was first developed in 
the context of third-party cases. The earliest case, Hilker v. Western 
Automobile Insurance Co., established that an insurer’s failure to pay 
for the insured’s legal defense because it believed sincerely and 
incorrectly that the claim against the insured fell outside the contract 
was a violation of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing that 
sounded in negligence.136 Other courts soon allowed for punitive 
damages when a litigant could prove that the insurer’s refusal to 
defend was consciously wrongful.137 California expanded third-party 
failure to perform to include not only the “duty to defend” but also the 
“duty to settle,” which was the subject of the Crisci case, discussed 
above.138 
Only after Crisci did courts extend the tort principles 
developed in third-party bad faith cases to first-party cases. Here too, 
California took the lead, in Gruenberg v. Aetna Insurance Co.139 
Gruenberg’s business, a cocktail lounge, burned down. He made a 
claim to his fire insurer, Aetna, who refused the claim because it 
believed that Gruenberg intentionally started the fire.140 The court 
allowed Gruenberg to sue Aetna in tort, including for noneconomic 
damages for pain and suffering.141 The court based its extension of the 
tort from third- to first-party breaches of insurance contracts on the 
grounds that the promise to protect the insured against liability and 
the promise to protect the insured against fire losses “are merely two 
different aspects of the same duty [that establishes] . . . the 
obligation . . . under which the insurer must act fairly and in good 
faith in discharging its contractual responsibilities.”142 
 
 135. See Richmond, supra note 22, at 80 (outlining numerous cases regarding third-party 
bad faith litigation). 
 136. 231 N.W. 257, 261 (Wis. 1930). 
 137. Richard B. Graves III, Comment, Bad-Faith Denial of Insurance Claims: Whose Faith, 
Whose Punishment? An Examination of Punitive Damages and Vicarious Liability, 65 TUL. L. 
REV. 395, 397 (1990). 
 138. Richmond, supra note 22, at 78. 
 139. 510 P.2d 1032, 1037 (Cal. 1973). 
 140. An investigator hired by Aetna may have had some role in convincing the police that 
Gruenberg had committed arson, a charge which was dropped for lack of probable cause after a 
magistrate’s hearing. Id. at 1035. 
 141. Id. at 1041. 
 142. Id. at 1037. 
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The tort of bad faith did not gain the same widespread 
acceptance in first-party insurance contracts as in third-party 
insurance contracts.143 However, the fact that about half the states 
have permitted claims for first-party bad faith, and that the tort has 
evoked very strong criticisms, suggests that it is important to see what 
risks might be present in the third-party context that are absent in 
the first-party context.144 According to Powers, the main difference lies 
in the fact that in the first-party context, the insured and insurer 
merely disagree over the “requirements of the contract,” which is 
“something that could happen in any contract dispute.”145 Leaving 
aside the question of why the insured and insurer are not also 
disagreeing over the “requirements of the contract” in third-party 
cases (especially in the duty to defend context), it is worth asking 
whether the counterparty interests the insurer risks in the first-party 
cases are different than those risked in the third-party cases, even if 
Powers’s description of the disagreement is correct. In fact, the risks 
are significantly different. 
The risk of shirking is much more serious in terms of its effects 
in third-party insurance contracts compared to first-party insurance 
contracts. When the insurer refuses to pay the insured the money 
promised under the insurance contract in a property insurance case 
like Gruenberg, it is a form of “take the money and run,” but not in the 
same way as in a liability insurance case like Crisci. In both cases, the 
insurer takes the premiums and “runs off” with them without paying 
the expected cost of the indemnity for which they contracted. But in 
the third-party case, the value of the indemnity is not just the amount 
the insurer would have paid (the policy limits), but also the excess 
judgment the insured would have avoided. Shirking a liability 
insurance contract produces potentially huge externalities for the 
insured that far outweigh the gains for the insurer. The same is not 
true in a first-party insurance contract. While the loss of an expected 
indemnity will impose costs on the insured in first-party insurance, 
 
 143. “While third-party bad faith quickly gained acceptance and is now widely-recognized as 
an independent tort, courts have been less willing to apply tort principles to the first-party 
insurance relationship.” Richmond, supra note 22, at 104. In 1994, Henderson estimated that “at 
least” twenty-four states had adopted the Gruenberg principle, as well as five more that allowed 
for expanded damages under contract principles or statute. Henderson, supra note 18, at 1153–
55.  
 144. For criticisms, see Powers, supra note 62, at 1230 (asserting that first-party insurance 
cases are no different from any normal contract dispute, thus not needing any special 
consideration); Sykes, supra note 22, at 406–08 (explaining that courts have split on the issue of 
whether to grant special remedies in first-party insurance cases and that those remedies may 
not be necessary, especially when the breach is unintentional). 
 145. Powers, supra note 62, at 1230. 
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the range of that loss is both limited and known in advance by the 
insured.146 
The difference between first- and third-party insurance 
contracts nicely illustrates the risk of foregoing an opportunity and 
entrusting it to another party. One of the reasons why the claim of an 
insured like Crisci sounds in tort rather than contract is that the 
interest that the insured contracted to protect—peace of mind in the 
face of a liability claim—is worth the cost of insurance not only 
because liability claims are potentially openended, but also because 
they are financial risks that are not homogenous over time. Litigation 
is a process with definite strategic decision points that are only 
partially under the control of the insured. At a certain point, the 
failure to accept a settlement means, for all intents and purposes, a 
commitment to go to trial.147 In other words, settlement offers are 
opportunities that if foregone by the insured, may be lost and never 
regained. In first-party insurance contracts, there is no opportunity 
that is lost due to the failure to provide the promised coverage (except 
in special cases where the money was especially valuable at a specific 
point in time because of an opportunity that was time sensitive). If 
there is a risk arising from loss of an opportunity due to failure to 
perform the first-party insurance contract, it is homogenous 
throughout the performance of the contract. In third-party insurance, 
the value of the settlement opportunity is dynamic.  
The risk of loss of control is much more significant in third-
party insurance bad faith than first-party insurance bad faith. In first-
party insurance contracts, the insured has no reason to value control 
other than the control over the payment of the money owed to her by 
the insurer, which is already captured by the risk she faces of the 
insurer shirking. On the other hand, loss of control is a central risk of 
the third-party insurance contract. The decision whether to settle, in 
addition to exposing the insured to potentially unlimited liability and 
removing from them a strategic decision point in the litigation, is also 
an example of control in its purest form. Especially for insureds who 
feel that any agreement with a plaintiff is like an admission of fault, 
the very fact of settlement may cut against their idea of what, ideally, 
litigation should achieve. The same cannot be said for the frustration 
an insured feels where the insurer wrongly—even intentionally 
 
 146. See Sykes, supra note 22, at 419–21 (suggesting possibilities for assessing damages 
related to the loss or delay of an expected indemnity). 
 147. We are aware that cases may settle at any time, including after so-called final 
settlement offers are rejected, but it is also true that human dynamics can overtake the litigation 
process making the cost of rejecting a “final” settlement offer exponentially higher than the cost 
of rejecting the plaintiff’s first settlement offer. 
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wrongly—delays or denies the money owed under the insurance 
contract. As Sykes points out, to the extent that the expected value of 
the insurance settlement has market value, the insured can sell the 
claim (or borrow using the claim as security) and recapture the 
transaction costs through contract damages.148 In this sense, Powers is 
correct: the delay and frustration felt by an insured who is denied 
money to which he has a contract right is no different than the delay 
and frustration felt by any creditor who is denied money to which he 
has a contract right.149 
B. Duties as a Matter of Contract Law 
1. Introduction 
Part III.A argued that tort doctrines marching under the 
banner of good faith are an inappropriate framework for regulating 
commercial litigation investments. The parties themselves are in a 
better position to perceive and safeguard against the possible risks of 
litigation investment than are courts, juries, administrative agencies, 
or other external decisionmakers. In a social and political system that 
values individual autonomy and liberty, people generally ought to be 
permitted to make decisions respecting their own welfare. (Default 
rules in contract law can be established with reference to what most 
people want, most of the time, thereby reducing bargaining costs.)150 
Tort law is best suited to situations in which there is good reason to 
believe that, systematically speaking, one party is incapable of 
protecting its interests effectively. In other cases, tort rights come 
with a built-in cost resulting from their open-ended nature and 
retrospective application to commercial relationships. Juries applying 
general norms of reasonableness systematically second-guess 
decisions made by parties who had an opportunity to allocate rights 
and duties among themselves. If there is no reason to believe the 
parties are not in a good position to determine what protection they 
need, there is no basis for substituting tort norms for those of contract. 
Contract law is superior to tort as a means of mitigating the 
risks inherent in commercial litigation investment for several reasons. 
First, the intrusion of the tort system into economic relationships is 
justifiable only when there is reason to believe that there are affected 
third parties who are unable to bargain for an appropriate level of 
 
 148. Sykes, supra note 22, at 421.  
 149. Powers, supra note 62, at 1230.  
 150. Gillette, supra note 9, at 541–42 (describing idea of “majoritarian default rules”). 
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protection.151 If customers were frequently injured at amusement 
parks or poisoned at restaurants, they would stop patronizing those 
businesses. Because many commercial actors have a preexisting 
incentive to take precautions to protect their customers, courts 
applying the reasonable care standard in tort lawsuits should refer to 
the customary standard of care prevailing in these industries when 
applying the negligence standard. The paradigmatic example of this 
deference by courts is in medical malpractice cases, where the custom 
among physicians practicing in a particular area of specialization is 
dispositive of the standard of care. In commercial litigation-
investment transactions, not only do the parties in theory have the 
ability to bargain over the terms of their relationship, but they almost 
certainly have actually bargained over even the finest points in the 
contract. 
Second, contract law is much more sensitive to the specific 
risks that the parties face in a particular transaction; tort law applies 
a more one-size-fits-all approach to regulating conduct. Tort law relies 
on general standards of conduct, usually elaborations of the 
overarching reasonable care norm, which courts and juries apply 
retrospectively when there is a legally cognizable injury. Tort 
standards are ostensibly forward-looking—that is, a party is evaluated 
according to whether he did what a reasonable person would have 
done at the time—but the application of legal norms by 
decisionmakers is highly susceptible to hindsight bias.152 In contract 
law, by contrast, the standard itself is up for grabs; the parties 
determine what duties they owe to each other. 
Contract doctrine reflects a commitment to the values of 
individuality, autonomy, consent, privacy, and voluntary assumption 
of duties.153 As a result, the parties themselves, as opposed to judges 
and juries, make the decisions regarding the allocation of rights and 
duties and the remedies available in the case of default by the other. 
The parties can bargain for a liquidated-damages clause, for example, 
if they wish to price the risk of future breach. In the context of 
commercial litigation funding, the risks the parties face are highly 
specific to the terms of the deal the parties have reached. The risks of 
 
 151. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, The Path to The T.J. Hooper: The Theory and History of 
Custom in the Law of Tort, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 13–16 (1992) (discussing the use of the custom, 
usually a principle used in the tort system, in analyzing transactions within an industry). 
 152. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in Hindsight, 65 
U. CHI. L. REV. 571, 572–73 (1998) (explaining how hindsight bias effects decisionmakers as they 
attempt to apply the reasonableness standard, already knowing that the defendant’s conduct 
resulted in an injury). 
 153. Powers, supra note 62, at 1214. 
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litigation investment, such as information asymmetry and shirking, 
are categorical and general, meant only to suggest the specific types of 
problems the parties may anticipate. Where it is difficult to generalize 
ex ante about the specific form a risk will take and the best means of 
mitigating it, courts should rely on the terms of the parties’ 
agreement, with general duties serving at most as default rules.154 
There may be a few categories of cases about which it is 
possible to generalize. Sometimes one party is dependent upon 
another for “natural reasons” relating to facts about the natural world. 
Parties may be in a “special relationship,” as the common law labels it, 
of parent-child, innkeeper-guest, carrier-passenger, guardian-ward, 
and so on, which supports moral and sometimes legal duties to care 
for the party in a position of vulnerability. The common-law category 
of “special relationship” encompasses these relationships of natural 
dependency.155 Where there is a natural dependency, there is a special 
relationship, and from this it follows that there may be duties as a 
matter of tort law. 
Similarly, the Crisci case and other cases involving bad faith 
conduct by third-party liability insurers show that certain types of 
vulnerabilities are “baked in” to a liability insurance contract. It will 
always be the case that the insurer’s downside will be capped at the 
policy limits. Thus, if a plaintiff makes an offer to settle at the policy 
limits, the insurer could decide to exercise its right to control the 
litigation to insist on going to trial, effectively gambling with the 
insured’s money. The law imposes heightened obligations of good faith 
on insurers in these situations because of the structural, built-in 
vulnerability the liability insurance contract creates. In the great run 
of cases, however, parties become dependent upon one another only 
because they have agreed to make it so. If there is no natural 
dependency at the outset, but dependency has arisen in the 
relationship, the parties have presumably concluded that it is to their 
mutual advantage to structure their relationship in this way. The law 
must be cautious about interfering with dependencies of this type, 
because unwinding contractual relationships generally upsets an 
 
 154. See Gillette, supra note 9, at 544–45 (pointing out some flaws in using only default rules 
and suggesting that courts should turn to the written document and the prior conduct of the 
parties). 
 155. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314A (1965) (enumerating common-law 
categories). Numerous cases involve attempts by plaintiffs to expand these categories to include 
the relationship with the defendant so as to support affirmative duties to protect the plaintiff 
from harm. See, e.g., Farwell v. Keaton, 240 N.W.2d 217, 221–22 (Mich. 1976) (finding a special 
relationship where the plaintiff and defendant were “companions on a social venture”); Harper v. 
Herman, 499 N.W.2d 472, 474–75 (Minn. 1993) (distinguishing a social boating trip from 
common-law special-relationship categories). 
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agreed-upon set of rights and duties that the parties adopted for their 
own, autonomously chosen reasons. 
Theorists tend to react very differently to the problem of how a 
legal relationship should adapt to changing circumstances depending 
on whether their sympathies lie generally with the institutions and 
procedures of the tort system—courts and juries as decisionmakers, 
applying open-ended standards of conduct—or with the bargaining 
over the terms of an agreement that characterize contract law. 
Consider the much-discussed issue of efficient breach of contract.156 
Economic theorists like Richard Posner see nothing wrong with one 
party breaking its promise to perform as long as it compensates the 
other party. The purpose of contract damages is to give the promisor 
an incentive to keep its promise unless the result would be an 
inefficient use of resources.157 If the seller has promised to produce 
some part that is critical to the buyer’s production process, but a third 
party comes along and offers a significant premium over the contract 
price to the seller, “there will be an incentive to commit a breach. But 
there should be.”158 The breaching party gains by taking advantage of 
the new opportunity, and the nonbreaching party, by receiving 
expectation damages, is placed in the same position it would have 
 
 156. See, e.g., Barry E. Adler, Efficient Breach Theory Through the Looking Glass, 83 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 1679, 1679 (2008); David W. Barnes, The Anatomy of Contract Damages and Efficient 
Breach Theory, 6 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 397, 397 (1998); Richard Craswell, Contract Remedies, 
Renegotiation, and the Theory of Efficient Breach, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 629, 630 (1988); Daniel A. 
Farber, Reassessing the Economic Efficiency of Compensatory Damages for Breach of Contract, 66 
VA. L. REV. 1443, 1443–45 (1980); Farnsworth, supra note 21, at 1380; Daniel Friedmann, The 
Efficient Breach Fallacy, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 1 (1989); Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, 
Liquidated Damages, Penalties and the Just Compensation Principle: Some Notes on an 
Enforcement Model and a Theory of Efficient Breach, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 554, 557–58 (1977); 
Avery Katz, Virtue Ethics and Efficient Breach, 45 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 777, 777 (2012); Gregory 
Klass, To Perform or Pay Damages, 98 VA. L. REV. 143, 143 (2012); Jody S. Kraus, The 
Correspondence of Contract and Promise, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1603, 1605–06 (2009); Ian R. 
Macneil, Efficient Breaches of Contract: Circles in the Sky, 68 VA. L. REV. 947, 947–50 (1982); 
Joseph M. Perillo, Misreading Oliver Wendell Holmes on Efficient Breach and Tortious 
Interference, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1085, 1090–93 (2000); Steven Shavell, Is Breach of Contract 
Immoral?, 56 EMORY L.J. 439, 456–59 (2006); Seana Valentine Shiffrin, The Divergence of 
Contract and Promise, 120 HARV. L. REV. 708, 729–33 (2007).  
 157. POSNER, supra note 25, § 4.10, at 150.  
 158. Id. at 133. Posner’s example:  
Suppose I sign a contract to deliver 100,000 custom-ground widgets at 10¢ apiece to A 
for use in his boiler factory. After I have delivered 10,000, B comes to me, explains 
that he desperately needs 25,000 custom-ground widgets at once since otherwise he 
will be forced to close his pianola factory at great cost, and offers me 15¢ apiece for 
them. I sell him the widgets and as a result do not complete timely delivery to A, 
causing him to lose $1,000 in profits. Having obtained an additional profit of $1,250 
on the sale to B, I am better off even after reimbursing A for his loss, and B is also 
better off. 
Id. at 151.  
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been if the contract had been performed. The result is Pareto optimal. 
Granted, the seller could have attempted to renegotiate with the 
buyer, but this would have introduced transaction costs.159 The 
efficient solution would be to let the seller unilaterally decide not to 
perform under the contract and to pay expectancy damages to the 
buyer. (Other remedies, such as specific performance, might be 
inefficient relative to this baseline unless renegotiation costs were 
low.) Contract remedies should not overdeter efficient breaches. There 
may be reputational or other reasons for the seller not to breach, but 
as long as the seller is willing to compensate the buyer for losing the 
expected value of the contract, there is no basis for using a remedy 
that would prevent the breach. 
Even Posner, sometimes caricatured as “Mr. Efficient Breach” 
himself, recognizes an exception to the efficient breach doctrine for 
contracts in which performance is inherently sequential.160 
Performance is generally sequential in commercial litigation-
investment contracts, but the transaction underlying those contracts 
is generally a one-shot purchase of a share in the claim in exchange 
for a contingent interest in a share of the proceeds. Posner goes so far 
as to say that “the fundamental function of contract law . . . is to deter 
people from behaving opportunistically toward their contracting 
parties.”161 Naturally, the question arises, “What does it mean to 
behave opportunistically?” Posner defines opportunistic behavior as 
trying to “tak[e] advantage of the vulnerabilities created by the 
sequential character of contractual performance.”162 For example, a 
sequentially performed contract often creates sunk costs in the form of 
transaction-specific investments. 
The problem with Posner’s definition is that sometimes these 
very vulnerabilities are built into the design of the contract to serve as 
a bonding mechanism.163 They may create incentives for opportunistic 
breaches of one sort, but they may deter breaches of another sort. For 
example, a loan agreement may provide that the lender has sole 
discretion to refuse to make further loans and to declare outstanding 
amounts payable immediately, as in the well-known case of K.M.C. 
Co. v. Irving Trust Co.164 That way, if the lender concludes that the 
 
 159. Scott, supra note 8, at 2010 (“[B]argain theory ignores the significant barriers to 
renegotiation, or ex post bargaining, that exist in many contractual relationships.”). 
 160. POSNER, supra note 25, § 4.1, at 115–16. 
 161. Jordan v. Duff & Phelps, Inc., 815 F.2d 429, 438 (1987) (alteration in original). 
 162. See POSNER, supra note 25, § 4.1, at 115–16 (defining good faith as opposed to 
opportunistic behavior).  
 163. Fischel, supra note 13, at 139.  
 164. 757 F.2d 752, 754 (6th Cir. 1985). 
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borrower is misbehaving, perhaps by making risky investments or 
mismanaging the company, the lender can protect itself from further 
harm by refusing to extend more credit. The contract provision serves 
as a bond because it enables the party at risk—in this case, the 
lender—to protect itself without having to incur the transaction costs 
associated with suing for breach. However, if a court concludes, as the 
Sixth Circuit did in K.M.C., that the lender acted in bad faith by 
denying the borrower an additional line of credit, the implied term of 
good faith would undercut the bonding effect of the sequenced lending 
structure.165 
The contract’s design in K.M.C. seems to create either the risk 
of misbehavior by the borrower or the risk of opportunistic behavior by 
the lender; there does not appear to be a way to eliminate one of those 
risks without creating or exacerbating the other. Daniel Fischel uses 
K.M.C. and another important lender-liability case, State National 
Bank of El Paso v. Farah Manufacturing Co.,166 to demonstrate the 
importance of relying on the terms of the parties’ bargain when 
assessing good faith performance. In Farah, three banks that 
extended $22 million in credit to a company were worried that the 
company’s former CEO, who had caused the company substantial 
losses, would return to his former position.167 Thus, they negotiated a 
clause providing that the company would be in default under the loan 
agreement if the former CEO returned.168 When the former CEO 
returned after a proxy fight, the banks threatened to call the loan and 
accelerate the amount due.169 The company sued for fraud, tortious 
interference with contract, and business coercion (economic duress).170 
Although not relying on the implied term of good faith, the court held 
that the banks acted unlawfully by asserting their right to call the 
loans in response to the former CEO’s return.171 Fischel argues that 
the lenders in both K.M.C. and Farah did not behave opportunistically 
because they were merely seeking the protection of a contract 
provision meant to safeguard against the very risk that subsequently 
occurred—the deteriorating financial condition of the borrower in 
 
 165. Fischel, supra note 13, at 142 (“The strength of the bond, however, is weakened if the 
borrower can argue to a court that the exercise of discretion granted to the lender by the 
agreement was not done in good faith.”). 
 166. 678 S.W.2d 661, 661–99 (Tex. App. 1984). 
 167. Id. at 666–67. 
 168. Id. at 667. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. at 668. 
 171. Id. at 669. 
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K.M.C. and the return of the former CEO in Farah.172 The courts 
erred, according to Fischel, by relying on extracontractual fiduciary 
duties or contractual duties of good faith that did not use the terms of 
the parties’ bargain as a starting point. 
2. Bad Faith Breach of Contract 
The hypothetical in Part II contains numerous actions that 
could be characterized as bad faith dealing. Owner had private 
information regarding his risk preferences that he did not disclose to 
Investor. Owner promised to use the funds invested in the claim to 
pay the expenses of litigation but dissipated half of the funds on a 
luxury vacation.173 Investor delayed responding to Partner’s 
settlement offer in order to capture an increase in the rate due under 
the contract. Finally, Investor knew that Owner needed funds to 
continue the litigation but refused to provide them when Owner 
declined to accept a settlement offer with financial terms that were 
advantageous to Investor (and, arguably, to Owner as well). Because 
we have established that the idea of bad faith conduct should not be 
given substance using tort doctrines, we now must articulate how it 
should be understood in terms of contract law.174 As a matter of the 
theory of the tort-contract border, the specific question will be how to 
 
 172. Fischel, supra note 13, at 143, 145–46. 
 173. Several commentators have argued that the example is unrealistic here because no 
sensible party in the position of Investor would have failed to protect itself against this risk by 
using a different transactional structure—e.g., paying the funds directly to the law firm. We 
have elected to leave in this feature of the hypothetical, however unrealistic, to illustrate another 
risk in contractual relationships, namely, that of a simple mistake or oversight by one of the 
parties. Moreover, Owner in the hypothetical did agree to use the invested funds solely for the 
purpose of litigation. One’s attitude toward contracts is revealed by the intuition that Owner’s 
promise alone is an inadequate protection for Investor’s interest in not having the funds 
dissipated on nonlitigation expenses. 
 174. See, e.g., Burton, supra note 28, at 369 (arguing that bad faith occurs “when discretion 
is used to recapture foregone opportunities”); E. Allan Farnsworth, Good Faith Performance and 
Commercial Reasonableness Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 30 U. CHI. L. REV. 666, 666–
70 (1963) (discussing the concept of good faith as it appears in the UCC and how it relates to the 
concept of commercial reasonableness); Robert A. Hillman, Contract Modification Under the 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 680, 686 (1982) (discussing the concept of 
good faith as it relates and applies to contract modification); Robert A. Hillman, Policing 
Contract Modifications Under the UCC: Good Faith and the Doctrine of Economic Duress, 64 
IOWA L. REV. 849, 856–57 (1979) (discussing bad faith as it relates to contract modification and 
unconscionability); Robert S. Summers, The General Duty of Good Faith – Its Recognition and 
Conceptualization, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 810, 810–12 (1982) (documenting the development of 
good faith and its inclusion in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts); Robert S. Summers, 
“Good Faith” in General Contract Law and the Sales Provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, 
54 VA. L. REV. 195, 195–99 (1968) (discussing solutions within the law to the problem of bad 
faith). 
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develop a bad faith norm in contract law without collapsing a contract-
law remedy into the disfavored tort action for bad faith. 
To take one example from our hypothetical contract, the 
investment agreement gives Investor discretion to make further 
contributions in exchange for an increased share of the recovery. As 
the litigation continued, and after Owner improvidently blew some of 
the money, Investor found it advantageous to deny further 
contributions and pressure Owner to settle, while Owner preferred a 
second infusion of cash so that he could proceed to trial in the hopes of 
obtaining an injunction. Investor clearly knew that refusing the 
second round of funding would greatly increase the financial pressure 
on Owner and probably force a settlement to which Owner otherwise 
would not agree. Did Investor act in bad faith by declining to fund the 
second tranche, knowing of Owner’s financial predicament? Or, should 
a court find no breach here because Owner could have protected 
himself by securing a promise at the time of contract formation that 
Investor would be obligated to fund subsequent tranches? Conversely, 
and analogizing to the K.M.C. and Farah cases, should the Investor’s 
right to decline to make further contributions be understood as a 
bonding mechanism that offered protection against foolish or self-
interested behavior by Owner? 
Notice that this question does not pertain solely to the 
remedies available for breach. Many of the tort bad faith cases involve 
a clear breach of the contract and a promisee who seeks consequential 
damages, not only expectation damages. Consider the Seaman’s case 
discussed in Part III.A.2,175 for example, where it is perfectly clear 
that Standard Oil breached the contract; the question in that case was 
whether the plaintiff could recover consequential and punitive 
damages. In our hypothetical, however, Investor has no obligation to 
continue funding the litigation. The parties had an opportunity to 
bargain for an obligation to make future contributions (or perhaps a 
contingent obligation, depending on the occurrence of certain 
conditions specified ex ante), but did not do so. Labeling Investor’s 
conduct as bad faith in relation to the contract would effectively 
amend the contract to incorporate extracontractual norms of ex post 
fairness. It may be the case that Owner is in a position of dependency 
or vulnerability with regard to Investor, which may rise to the level of 
de facto control by Investor over the Owner’s litigation conduct.176 But, 
 
 175. Seaman’s Direct Buying Serv., Inc. v. Standard Oil Co., 686 P.2d 1158, 1158–77 (Cal. 
1984). 
 176. See Burton, supra note 28, at 380–83 (discussing cases where norms of good faith are 
enforced because one party is dependent upon the other).  
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notice that Investor and Owner found themselves in a strong and 
weak position, respectively, at a future time only because of decisions 
they made at the time the contract was formed. The terms of the 
parties’ contract, not some feature of their extracontractual 
relationship, created the dependency. 
From the point of view of contract law, the theoretical risk is 
that an open-ended good faith doctrine may permit a court to deem 
Investor’s decision a breach of an implied term of the contract even 
though the express terms of the contract grant Investor the privilege 
(correlative with Owner’s no-right) to refuse further funding. Doing so 
would collapse bad faith as a matter of contract law into tort bad faith, 
with all of the attendant problems that led California and most other 
jurisdictions to abandon the freestanding bad faith tort.177 
To avoid the collapse into tort, contract-law theorists have 
attempted to ground the standard for determining bad faith in some 
aspect of the contract itself. Steven Burton, for example, has argued 
that a party acts in bad faith if it uses discretion conferred by the 
contract in order to recapture opportunities that were foregone at the 
time of formation: “A reasonable person . . . would enter a contract 
that confers discretion on the other party only on the belief that the 
discretion will not be used to recapture forgone opportunities.”178 
Contracts with an open price or quantity term, for example, might 
have been deemed unenforceable for lack of definiteness, but the 
implied term of good faith provided an obligation that was sufficiently 
clear to permit courts to enforce these contracts.179 
In the hypothetical, Investor’s opportunity costs in this 
transaction include the foregone opportunity to invest the initial 
$500,000 contribution in other cases—that much is clear. But Investor 
would argue that it did not forego the opportunity to direct its assets 
to transactions with parties other than Owner; it did not precommit to 
making subsequent investments, thereby incurring additional 
opportunity costs. Burton’s test is a mixed subjective-objective inquiry. 
Subjectively, it matters whether Investor acted in order to recapture a 
foregone opportunity; objectively, the reasonable expectation of the 
parties ex ante determine the identity of the foregone opportunity.180 
Alternatively, the objective standard can be elaborated in terms of 
commercial norms based on the decency, fairness, or reasonableness of 
 
 177. See supra note 109 and accompanying text. 
 178. Burton, supra note 28, at 387. 
 179. Id. at 388–89. 
 180. Id. at 390–91. 
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the commercial community of which the parties are members.181 
Finally, one could give a Coasean account of the duty of good faith, in 
which the parties’ duties approximate the bargain they would have 
reached if they were able to bargain without costs, either at the outset 
of the relationship or when changed circumstances arose.182 
Whether the standard for assessing contract good faith turns 
on the opportunities (objectively) foregone by the parties or the terms 
of a hypothetical bargain, a great deal depends on assumptions about 
the parties’ ability to forecast and plan for the occurrence of events in 
the future. 
Any attempt to decipher the parties’ intent from a written 
document may reflect a certain fetish regarding the ability and 
practice of commercial parties to form intentions about the full scope 
of their relationship at its initial stages. It suggests to a potentially 
unrealistic degree that parties can recognize their intentions and draft 
documents that embody those intentions in a manner comprehensible 
to trading partners and courts.183 
We do not rely on unrealistic assumptions about the rationality 
or prescience of the parties in arguing for an essentially contract-
centered approach to good faith. Nor do we assume that the long-term 
nature of a litigation-investment relationship necessarily means that 
the parties are acting altruistically. Investor and Owner in our 
hypothetical are both motivated by their own interests; they merely 
realize that a contractual relationship will enable both of them to 
realize these interests. 
When one party takes advantage of an event that occurs 
subsequent to the contract’s completion, the question is whether this 
constitutes defection from the prior agreement to cooperate in pursuit 
of joint ends or, on the other hand, whether the other party bargained 
away the right to insist on not seizing that opportunity.184 
“[C]ooperation,” in the words of Clayton Gillette, “is not the only way 
to deal with unallocated risks.”185 Investor presumably has funded a 
diversified portfolio of cases so that a loss on one is made up for by 
gains on another. Owner may similarly hedge by negotiating a 
discounted fee with Law Firm or, perhaps, a contingent fee agreement. 
But this analysis assumes that a risk is unallocated. The parties’ 
agreement may reveal instead that they contemplated a particular 
 
 181. Farnsworth, supra note 174, at 671–72.  
 182. Fischel, supra note 13, at 147. 
 183. Gillette, supra note 9, at 544 n.34. 
 184. Id. at 548. 
 185. Id. at 551. 
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risk and decided that one of them should bear it. Returning to 
Fischel’s point about bonding,186 Investor may have worried that 
Owner would not use the invested funds wisely, so Investor protected 
itself by refusing to agree to a duty to make subsequent contributions. 
It would be an erroneous application of the good faith doctrine to 
permit Owner to recapture the opportunity to secure a commitment to 
make subsequent investments when it had bargained away that right, 
perhaps in exchange for a larger initial contribution or some other 
advantage. The analysis may be different if one party had induced the 
other to make a substantial, contract-specific investment,187 but in 
this case money is fungible, and neither party is enabled to engage in 
strategic behavior simply due to the prior investment. 
Much of the relational contracting literature deals with 
circumstances that the parties did not anticipate at the time the 
initial contract was drafted or with unanticipated barriers to 
renegotiation.188 The risk created by asymmetric information is 
therefore a potentially significant barrier to an efficient bargain. 
Allocating this risk to the party who possesses the information can 
dampen its effects.189 In a relational contract, the parties desire to 
preserve their ongoing relationship and to harmonize conflict 
whenever possible;190 but because they are also mutually exposed to 
risks, they desire contract rules that mitigate those risks. An 
information-forcing rule may have the effect of creating conflict, but it 
may be constructive conflict. Such a rule could create just enough of 
an opposition of interests that the party who would ordinarily be 
disinclined to share information is required to disclose it. 
Sometimes, contract rules work at crosspurposes with other 
rules. In the lingo of relational contracting theory, the norm of 
“presentiation”—that the contracting parties ought to foresee future 
contingencies and incorporate them into their agreement—is in 
tension with the norm of flexibility and may also threaten the goals of 
 
 186. See Fischel supra notes 166–72 and accompanying text (arguing that sometimes 
vulnerabilities associated with the sequential nature of contracts are built into the agreements 
in order to alleviate having to incur costs associated with litigation). 
 187. See Scott, supra note 8, at 2011 (noting that specialized, contract-specific investment 
can make one party vulnerable to strategic behavior by the other party). 
 188. See, e.g., id. at 2011–12 (discussing Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Essex Grp., Inc., 499 F. 
Supp. 53 (W.D. Pa. 1980)); Victor Goldberg, Price Adjustments in Long-Term Contracts, 1985 
WIS. L. REV. 527, 527 (discussing price-adjustment mechanisms in contracts and the incentives 
for using such mechanisms in long-term relationships).  
 189. See Ian Ayres, Default Rules for Incomplete Contracts, in THE NEW PALGRAVE 
DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW (Peter Newman ed., 2002). 
 190. See Macneil, Internal and External, supra note 9, at 350–51 (stating that relational 
norms affect common contract norms and sometimes come into partial conflict with them). 
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preserving the relationship and harmonizing conflict.191 Similarly, a 
strong prohibition on exiting the relationship, as in the decision in 
K.M.C. holding the lender liable for winding up the loan agreement, 
diminishes the usefulness of the threat of exit as a means to deter 
breaches by the other party. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Our proposal is that the law should rely on bargained-for 
agreements among the parties to mitigate the bilateral risks 
associated with investment in commercial litigation (i.e., third-party 
financing involving sophisticated parties and negotiated investment 
agreements). In a commercial litigation-investment contract, it is 
unlikely that either party will be in a position of vulnerability prior to 
the bargaining process. The reasons supporting fiduciary duties in the 
third-party insurance context, moreover, do not apply to litigation-
investment contracts. Contract law is therefore better suited than 
regulation or tort liability to minimize both parties’ risks inherent in 
litigation investment. The contract-law good faith duty does not 
prevent the parties from contracting around various default rules, 
which is to say that extracontractual norms should play relatively 
little role in regulating commercial litigation investment. If one party 
becomes vulnerable because of an improvident bargain, that is just the 
risk sophisticated parties run when they enter into contracts. The 
parties’ bargain, however, may be interpreted in light of the course of 
dealing between the parties and, perhaps, trade custom, as long as 
courts are attempting to understand the agreement itself, not 
applying freestanding norms of reasonableness or good faith. The 
duties of good faith owed by the parties to each other are defined in 
relation to the agreement of the parties; they are not free-floating tort-
type duties that arise as a matter of law. 
 
 191. See Macneil, supra note 27, at 58–601 (explaining the term, “presentiation” and 
explaining high amounts of presentiation are more likely in short-term, discrete transactions 
rather than lasting relationships).  
